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The basic premise of a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) is that changes in 
technology, doctrine, and organization have the capability to render existing 
methods of conducting warfare obsolete. Two distinct visions of a future RMA are 
beginning to emerge within the defense community. The first involves the 
integration of precision guided munitions, and superior command, control, 
communication, computer, and intelligence (C4I) capabilities. The second vision is 
of information warfare. In this arena, the control and management of bits and bytes 
become more important than bullets. 
Because of the potential advantages gained from the realization of an RMA, it 
is imperative that United States detects, and accurately evaluates, any efforts by a 
potential adversary to achieve an RMA - whatever form it may take. Indications 
and Warning (I & W) intelligence is a process used by the intelligence community 
to detect indicators of potential threats while sufficient time still exist to counter 
those efforts. This thesis examines "how" and "why" technology, doctrine, and 
organizations change in order to develop indicators that can be used to detect an 
emerging RMA 
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Many military analysts believe that the skillful use of advanced sensors, an integrated 
Command and Control Warfare (C2W) effort, and "smart" munitions by the U.S.-led 
coalition in the Gulf War, provided a glimpse of future warfare. Others contend that future 
"Information Wars" (IW) will be fought in the virtual world of "cyberspace" for control of 
a nation's financial and economic networks.1 Still others, such as Andrew Krepinevich, 
assert that senior defense officials do not know how the next national security challenge 
will manifest itself.2 All of these possibilities pose a critical problem for the United States. 
In past wars, the U.S. has had time to pursue and overtake enemies that started with 
superior technologies, doctrine, and organizational concepts. That luxury may not be 
available in future conflicts. As an example, we are now entering the information age — 
which implies that tomorrow's wars will be fought more with bits than bullets. The force 
decisions that are made today will largely determine military capabilities over the next 10 to 
20 years. In order to ensure that the U.S. military is capable of neutralizing future threats, 
irrespective of their form, it is imperative that revolutionary means of conducting warfare 
are identified as early as possible. Only by early identification of the threat can a full 
1
 Authors who have offered such scenarios include Winn Schwartau, Information Warfare, (New York: 
Thunder's Mouth Press, 1994) and Richard Power, Information Warfare, (San Francisco, CA: Computer 
Security Institute (CSI), 1995). 
2
 Andrew F. Krepinevich is a an adjunct professor of strategic studies at the Paul A. Nitze School of 
Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University. His views on future security challenges can be 
found in the article "Recasting Military Roles and Missions," Issues in Science and Technology, Vol. XI, 
No. 3 (Spring 1995), p. 41-48. 
spectrum of options be developed and put in place to counter it. Failure to identify the 
threat could lead to a successful surprise attack and catastrophic losses on the battlefield. 
B. OBJECTIVE 
The objective of this thesis is to suggest indicators, or warning events, that can be 
observed long before revolutionary capabilities appear on the battlefield. Early detection 
ensures a large number of available options exist to counter revolutionary capabilities. 
Obviously, the earlier and more decisive the warning, the greater the opportunity of 
countering the new capabilities. The indicators must be well conceived to ensure that false 
alarms are rare and legitimate threats can be timely noted and dealt with. This is a difficult 
task when technologies are changing at a rapid rate and new forms of warfare, such as 
C2W and IW, loom on the horizon. 
C. METHOD 
The method used to develop these indicators is to apply the process of indications and 
warning (I & W) intelligence to the concept of a revolution in military affairs (RMA). 
The goal of indications and warning intelligence is to alert the intelligence analyst, and 
ultimately the policy-maker, to potential threats while sufficient time exists to prevent them 
from occurring or to lessen the effects if they do. Irrespective of the potential threat, 
I & W intelligence relies on two capabilities: (1) the ability to identify actions that must 
occur before the consequential event takes place and (2) the ability to detect and monitor 
those actions. 
The basic proposition underlying a so-called "revolution in military affairs" is that 
enlightened changes in technology, doctrine, and/or organization can render previous 
methods of conducting warfare obsolete. Because of the unique status of the strategic 
situation, available resources, and status of technology, each revolution is different. Some 
favor the offense, some the defense; some stem from the introduction of a new weapon, 
others from a novel idea about how wars can be fought.3  Whichever is the case, if a 
potentially hostile country or organization attempts to develop revolutionary capabilities, 
significant changes in at least one of the three vital components of a RMA, technology, 
doctrine, or organization, must take place prior to initiating hostilities. If the revolution is 
to realize its full potential, changes in all three of the components will take place. 
An examination of how and why technology, doctrine, and organizations change 
should lead to a number of indicators of a developing revolution in military affairs. Those 
indicators can then be used to alert policy-makers of potential threats and prevent friendly 
forces from being surprised on the battlefield by a new weapon or new means of 
employing existing ones. 
D. FORMAT 
This thesis is essentially divided into two parts.   In Chapters II and IE, the concept of a 
revolution in military affairs and the mission of I & W intelligence are explored. If the 
reader is thoroughly familiar with these two concepts, he or she may move directly to 
Chapter IV. In Chapters IV through VI, indicators are developed that could be employed 
3
 Michael J. Mazarr, The Military Technical Revolution, (Washington, D. C, The Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, 1993), p. 15. 
by the intelligence community to forecast potentially hostile RMAs. This is done by 
examining why and how the three vital enablers of a RMA - technology, doctrine and 
organization - develop and change. The final chapter will offer some conclusions and 
areas of additional research. 
II. THE RMA CONCEPT 
A. COMPONENTS OF A RMA 
1. Definition 
The rapidly expanding interest in the idea that military affairs stand on the brink of a 
"revolution" has generated a number of terms that seek to describe this phenomenon. 
Therefore, the first step is to define both the term and the concept. For this thesis, the 
term "Revolution in Military Affairs" means a fundamental change in technology, doctrine, 
or organization that renders existing methods of conducting warfare obsolete.1 Although a 
particular revolution may be weighted toward only one or two of the three components of a 
RMA ~ technology, doctrine, or organization - changes in all three are present in every 
revolution, and play a role. The other term which frequently appears in academic and 
professional publications, and describes the exact same concept as RMA, is "Military 
Technical Revolution," (MTR)2.   Although technology plays an essential part in all RMAs, 
this term does not convey the complete scope of changes that comprise a total revolution. 
Additionally, as will be illustrated later, significant RMAs have taken place during times 
1
 Michael J. Mazarr, The Military Technical Revolution: A Structural Framework, (Washington, D.C.: 
Center for Strategic and Intenational Studies, 1993), p. 16. 
2
 Authors using this term include Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., "Keeping Pace with the Military- 
Technological Revolution," Issues in Science and Technology Vol. X, No. 4, (Summer 1994), p. 23-29; 
Dan Goure, "Is There a Military-Technical Revolution in America's Future," The Washington Quarterly 
Vol. 16, No. 4, (Autumn 1993), p. 175-192; Paul F. Herman, Jr., "The Military-Technical Revolution," 
Defense Analysis Vol. 10, No. 1, (April 1994), p. 91-95; Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr, "Beyond Luddites and 
Magicians: Examining the MTR," Parameters Vol. XXV, No. 2, (Summer 1995), p. 15-21. 
when technology changed very little compared to previous wars. The term BMA will solely 
be used throughout this thesis when referring to a revolution which includes technological, 
doctrinal, and organizational changes.    The term MTR will be used when referring only to 
the technical aspects of a revolution. 
The common part of both expressions, "revolution," is justified by the parallels 
associated with political revolutions. Political revolutions are inaugurated by a growing 
sense, often restricted to a segment of the political community, that existing institutions 
have ceased adequately to meet the problems posed by an environment that they in part 
have created.3 From a Marxist perspective, when the revolution does occur, the old system 
is not simply discarded; but a new and different system takes its place. The old does not 
disappear all at once; its usable parts remain. However, the only "old" that continues to 
exists is that which finds a useful place in the environment created by the new.4 A military 
organization experiences a revolution in much the same way. New technologies, 
organizational structures, and doctrines that remain useful are incorporated into the new 
paradigm. Although this description of the revolutionary aspects of an RMA sounds 
relatively benign, the process can be every bit as difficult, painful, and have all the 
detractors found in a political revolution. Additionally, the failure to participate in a 
revolution can result in catastrophic defeat on the battlefield. The early nineteenth century 
European armies that initially opposed Napoleon are evidence of this. 
Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 
1962), p. 92. 
Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott, The Soviet Art of War: Doctrine, Strategy, and Tactics, (Boulder, 
Colorado: Westview Press, Inc., 1982), p. 123-124 
2. Criteria 
It is difficult to offer a single set of criteria that can provide a precise and definitive 
evaluation of what constitutes a revolution in military affairs. As noted by Jeffrey Cooper 
in Another View of the Revolution in Military Affairs, the many different concepts of an 
RMA being discussed has led to a situation similar to the parable of the blind men trying to 
identify an elephant while each is only touching one part.5   The plurality of views not 
withstanding, the following are criteria used by the majority of authors to evaluate what 
changes in the military constitute a revolution. 
- A change is revolutionary when it renders existing methods of warfare 
obsolete.6 
- A change is revolutionary when it fundamentally alters the character and 
conduct of conflict.7 
- A revolution is not based on the quickness of change, but on the 
magnitude of the change relative to preexisting military capabilities. 
A minority of authors, such as Arvin and Heidi Toffler, use stricter criteria. For them, 
revolutions in military affairs occur in conjunction with major societal, cultural, political, 
and economic changes.9   Thus, the Tofflers contend that there have been three revolutions 
in the history of man - the primitive to agrarian; the agrarian to the industrial; 
5
 Jeffrey R. Cooper, Another View of the Revolution in Military Affairs, (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: 
U.S. Army War College, 1994), p. 1. 
6
 Michael J. Mazarr, The Military Technical Revolution, p. 16. 
7
 Andrew F. Krepinevich, "Calvalry to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolutions," The National 
Interest, No. 37, (Fall 1994), p. 30. 
8
 James R. Fitzsimonds and Jan Van Tol, "Revolutions in Military Affairs," Joint Forces Quarterly, No. 4, 
(Spring 1994), p. 25. 
9
 Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War, (New York: Warner Books, 1993), p. 19-28. 
and the ongoing industrial to information revolution. Changes within these three 
revolutions would be characterized as evolutionary or progressionary advances. 
In order to better grasp what constitutes a revolutionary change, the following 
characteristics of a Revolution in Military Affairs are offered: 
1. That which was unquestionably an asset is now a potential liability. A vivid 
example of this is the revolution caused by the development of nuclear weapons. Before 
nuclear weapons, the massing of a large number of men and equipment was desired. 
However after nuclear weapons, large centrally located armies became extremely 
vulnerable to complete annihilation. The need for large armies did not disappear, but they 
did become much more vulnerable. 
2. If the revolution is primarily technical, completely new doctrines and 
organizations are established to promote the weapon an its capability. Again, the nuclear 
revolution offers a vivid example. The Soviet Union formed an entirely new organization, 
the Strategic Rocket Forces, and designated it as the primary arm of the military as part of 
the nuclear RMA. This action was not unique. All of the original five countries that 
developed nuclear weapons (The United States, Great Britain, France, Soviet Union, and 
China) created elaborate command structures to ensure strict control and the capability to 
authorize their use at a moment's notice. Additionally, new doctrines such as Mutually 
Assured Destruction (MAD) emerged. 
3. Failure to adopt the new revolutionary principles or effective counters all but 
guarantee failure on the battlefield. Napoleon's Grande Armee and corps system illustrates 
8 
this point. HwStiKhmstztes in European Armies and the Conduct of War, "As the 
Grande Armee passed its peak, its opponents began to assimilate some of the lessons of the 
Revolutionary Wars, and to incorporate them into their eighteenth-century dynastic 
armies."10   As the innovations were incorporated, the British and Prussian armies began to 
enjoy successes on the battlefield. 
B. HISTORICAL EXAMPLES 
To further ensure a common understanding exists as to what constitutes a revolution in 
military affairs, several historical examples of past RMAs are offered. Other than 
providing historical descriptions, the key purpose of these examples is to illustrate that 
significant changes occur in at least one of the three components that support a revolution 
in military affairs (technology, doctrine, and organization) in every case. Sometimes the 
most prominent aspect of the RMA is a new organizational structure; sometimes new 
technologies are primary, and sometimes new doctrine is at the forefront. However, as 
previously stated, all three pillars are present in every revolution, if only in a secondary 
role. 
1. Napoleonic RMA 
Modern examples of a Revolution in Military Affairs begin with Napoleon and the 
nation in arms. For the first time in history, the vast resources of a nation were used to 
equip and support a mass army. These resources were combined with a completely new 
»  Hew Sirachan, European Armies and the Conduct of War, (London: George Men & Unwin), p. 54. 
and unprecedented structure: an army 150,000 strong organized into eight numbered 
corps, each containing units of all arms and each provided with a uniformly structured, 
though not exactly permanent, staff to direct its operations - each a little army in its own 
right.   Although there were incremental increases in technology and the capability of 
certain weapons such as muskets and cannons, this revolution was almost totally based on 
changes in organization and doctrine. Training, organization, and doctrine - all of them 
anchored the newly established democratic regime and in the lev'ee-en-masse - were 
employed to overcome the technological limitations that had previously confined strategy to 
a straightjacket. Except for somewhat better maps, roads, and the Chapp'e telegraph, 
neither Napoleon's conquests nor his subsequent defeat can be explained in terms of 
technological factors.12 The result of the Napoleonic RMA was not just the ability to 
conquer a neighbor, but to seize a continent - or in modern terms, the means to wage a 
theater-wide campaign.13 
2. The Rifle, Railroad, and Telegraph RMA 
The next revolution took place in the second half of the nineteenth century and was 
highlighted by the American Civil and Franco-Prussian Wars. New types of weapons, 
such as breech loading rifles and rifled cannons (the latter made of steel rather than 
bronze), and new means of transport, the railways, were being introduced simultaneously, 
thus making necessary a complete reappraisal of the traditional methods of war. Even the 
^  Martin Van Creveld, Command in War, (Cambridge, Mass.: Havard University Press, 1985), p. 60 
]3   Martin Van Creveld, Technology and War, (New York: The Free Press, 1989), p. 167.' 
Jeffrey R. Cooper, Another View of the Revolution in MilitaryAffairs,(Carlis'le Baracks Pennsylvania- 
U.S. Army War College, 1994), p. 14. ' 
10 
stepchild of war ~ communications technology was finally showing signs of progress. The 
telegraph now presented armies with a new and some ways unprecedentedry effective 
means for transmitting information. However, the relation of science and industry to the 
soldier was in its infancy as the industrial revolution took place. The same inventors that 
were developing new products for the home and workplace were also developing new 
instruments for war. Despite widespread use of the new technlogies, none of the 
developments had reached a state of maturity in which the basic rules governing their 
employment, and its effects, were no longer the subject of debate.14 
The fixed nature of both railroads and the telegraph had significant ripple effects. The 
railroad was less flexible than columns of men and horses, which could always be made to 
go another mile or find their way around. Coordinating men, weapons, supplies, and 
trains, as well as maximizing each railway line's capacity and preventing congestion 
demanded a type of painstaking staff work. No longer was it possible for a single or select 
number of generals to organize the movement of a large army. During this time, the first 
true general staffs, such as with Prussian General H. von Moltke, began to emerge. 
Like the railroad, the telegraph also necessitated the formation of new specialized 
corps. Persons were needed to survey the route, install, operate, and maintain the new 
equipment. Because access to fixed communication points and the amount of information 
that could be passed in a given time was limited (usually eight to ten words a minute),16 
14
 Martin Van Creveld, Command in War, p. 104. 
15
 Ibid, p. 106. 
16
 Ibid, P-108. 
11 
doctrine was needed to regulate its use. The telegraph also had an influence on command 
style. Because the construction of new lines took time and could not keep up with the 
front or were easily destroyed if placed too close to the front, the temptation of the 
commander was to stay further to the rear. Additionally, communication tended to flow up 
the chain of command rather than down to the soldiers in the field. 
3. The Mass Production RMA 
World War I incorporated mass production technologies to equip multi-million men 
armies, to increase mechanization for support to logistics, and to employ factory products 
like the machine gun and barbed wire.17 A number of new and radical weapons such as 
the airplane, submarine, tank, and poison gas appeared on the battlefield in significant 
numbers despite the fact that organizational structures or doctrines for their use had not 
been fully developed. Coordination of previously unrealized numbers of soldiers and 
supplies became possible due wireless radios, telephones, trucks and automobiles, and 
improved railroads. 
Scientists began to produce significant effects on the battlefield during this war. This 
was a natural extension of the increasing scope of warfare that began with Napoleon. As 
entire nations were mobilized for warfare, the scientist and industrialist were naturally 
called on to contribute. Each side enlisted technical experts to solve specific battlefield 
problems. The British effort to combat the German U-boats illustrates how vital the role of 
the scientist had become. On September 23, 1914 a single German submarine sank three 
Jeffrey R. Cooper, Another View of the Revolution in Military Affairs, p. 14. 
12 
British armored cruisers resulting in the deaths of almost 1,500 sailors. Initial efforts by the 
Royal Navy to locate the U-boats included attempts to train sea gulls to perch on 
periscopes to make them more visible and the use of sea lions to detect intruders.    By 
1916 British scientists, physicists, chemists, and mathematicians developed two devices that 
were much more successful ~ the hydrophone and depth bomb.19 These new weapons, 
combined with the rediscovered doctrine of convoying merchant ships through high 
submarine threat areas, resulted in the failure of German efforts to blockade Britain. 
4. The Inter-war RMA 
The revolution that took place between the two World Wars is the one that has 
received the most attention by today's scholars and military officials. There are two 
principal reasons for this attention. First, there are a number of similarities that can be 
drawn between the strategic situation of the United States then and now. During this time 
frame, military institutions had to come to grips with enormous technological and doctrinal 
innovation during a time of minimal funding and relatively low popular support for military 
affairs. Second, the large number of countries involved in the Second World War provide 
numerous examples of which innovative strategies were successful and which failed. 
Thus, great opportunities for comparison exists. Finally, the innovations made during the 
1920s and 1930s were significant and not just on the margins. For example, the U.S. and 
Japanese navies changed the equation of war at sea with their creation of naval air power 
18
 Robert L. O'Connell, Sacred Vessels (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 162 
19
 Bernard and Fawn M. Brodie, From Crossbow to H-Bomb (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University 
Press, 1973), p. 184. 
13 
based on carriers that accompanied their fleets into battle. Similarly, the Germans 
developed an the Blitzkrieg armored force, based on a combined-arms concept, that 
overthrew the entire balance of power in Europe by its breakthrough on the banks of the 
Meuse and the exploitation ofthat success to the English channel. In the air war, Air 
Marshall Sir Hugh Dowding set the technological specifications for the Hurricane and 
Spitfire, supported the initial research into the possible use of radio waves to detect aircraft, 
and then created an air defense network based on these innovations.20 
5. The Nuclear RMA 
The next revolution began with the closing moves of the Second World War - the 
nuclear revolution. During this time, the destructive power of nuclear weapons, the 
advancements in rockets, and the rapid development of electronics and computer 
technology making possible the guidance systems for ballistic missiles were all introduced 
and perfected.21 Additionally, huge organizations were created to support these new 
weapons. Intelligence agencies, with revolutionary capabilities in their own right, were 
created to ascertain and monitor the status of enemy forces. Doctrines for the use of 
nuclear weapons also were created, debated, and changed as the weapon's capability 
improved and new intelligence was gathered. 
20 
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C. ORIGINS OF THE RMA CONCEPT 
The concept and study of military innovation and fundamental changes in the 
nature of warfare is not a new or recent phenomenon — although the vast amount of 
books, articles, and Department of Defense attention it has received over the past five years 
could lead one to believe otherwise. All of the relatively recent theories and 
comprehension of RMA concepts can be traced back to one of two sources. The first are 
classical military writings mat have been authored since the time of Sun Tzu.    Although 
the term "Revolution in Military Affairs" or the specific identification of changes in 
technology, doctrine, and organization as "revolutionary" does not appear until the essays 
of Michael Roberts in the early 1960s,23 the concepts are central to a multitude of works. 
The other origin is the writings of Karl Marx and his concepts of dialectical materialism. 
These writings and concepts provided the foundation for Soviet efforts to describe the 
changes in warfare following the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles that 
carried nuclear warheads - what they called a "Revolution in Military Affairs."   Interest 
by the United States military was negligible until essays and articles published in the late 
1970s by the Chief of the Soviet General Staff, Marshall Nikolay Ogarkov, postulated that 
a new revolution was in its infancy. Since that time, a myriad of scholars and officials 
22
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titled "Gustav Adolf and the Art of War" also discusses the revolutionary aspects of war. 
15 
from the United States have provided additional thoughts on the concept. An examination 
of the two roots and current thought follows. 
1. Classical Roots 
As previously stated, pre-1960 accounts of changes in military technology, doctrine, 
and organization do not specifically label the consequences as "a revolution in military 
affairs." However, the realization that these three items make a difference did not arise 
within the last 40 years. The implications of new technologies, doctrine, and 
organization were well understood by ancient warriors. The following examples will 
illustrate this point: 
At the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, light-armed troops 
were held in disdain. In the mountains of Aetolia, however, Athenian 
forces under Demosthenes were completely defeated by agile light-armed 
archers, who refused to come to close quarters. Before five years of 
this war had elapsed, it was perfectly clear that slingers, archers, and 
especially peltasts were necessary complements of an efficient army.24 
Before Philip [of Macedonia's] time no army, not even the 
Spartan, was kept constantly under arms. Although there had been 
before his day professional soldiers ... he was the first leader to 
institute a professional standing army imbued with a national spirit and 
instantly and permanently operative [Philip's son] Alexander the 
Great inherited his father's organizing ability as well as an organized 
army. With his improvements and additions, Greek military efficiency 
had reached its acme.25 
Treatises and discourses on warfare continued through the 19th and 20th centuries. 
Military thinkers of the 19th century such as Clausewitz and Jomini studied and wrote 
24 
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extensively on the innovations and revolutionary implications of Napoleon's "lev'ee-en- 
masse". In 1875 Bronsart von Schellendorff wrote "Generalstabsdienst," which was a 
technical treatise on the organization and procedures of the Prussian model for a general 
staff. This treatise was published in England, France, and the United States during the next 
25 years.26   The impact of the ideas in this treatise are seen by the nations of Europe 
adopting the Prussian General Staff model by the turn of the century. If the model was not 
adopted, it had to be accounted for because it was likely being used by a potential enemy. 
Following World War n, a multitude of descriptions and studies of the innovations that 
took place before and during the war were published. The British air defense network, the 
United States and Japanese successful development of carrier aviation, and the U.S. 
Marine Corps' creation of an amphibious assault mission are but a few examples of 
popular subjects. 
In the 1950s, Michael Roberts, a professor of Modern History at The Queen's 
University in Belfast, lectured and wrote on the effect changes in weapons technology from 
1560 till 1660 had on military organizations, how militaries fought, and the structure of 
society as a whole.27   This, in and of itself, is relatively unimportant. As chronicled in the 
previous paragraphs, similar works had long existed. What was new and important was his 
use of the term "military revolution" to describe the net effect innovations in military 
technology, organizational structure, and doctrine had on how wars were fought. 
26
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2. Soviet RMA Concepts 
When analyzing the development of the Soviet concept of military affairs, the 
Marxist-Leninist laws of dialectic materialism must be a primary consideration. Dialectical 
materialism is a general theory and method of philosophy developed by Plato and Aristotle 
and refined by Immanuel Kant and G. W. F. Hegel, and expounded by Karl Marx to 
explain the process of social evolution.28 Because the Soviet military was part of society, 
they too believed in these theories of change. As observed by Lawrence Fink of The 
National Institute for Public Policy, by extrapolating past and current developments in 
military affairs within this Marxist context, the Soviet military community attempted to 
predict the future course of both military strategy and technology. For the Soviet military 
leadership, these prognoses have not been viewed as purely academic exercises. Rather, 
they are regarded as serious and necessary endeavors, the proper use of which could 
facilitate the Soviet military's ability to develop new weapons and corresponding strategies 
for their use with greater expediency.29   Writing in 1981 for the Communist Party journal 
Kommunist, chief of the General Staff Marshal Nikolay Ogarkov wrote of dialectical 
materialism: 
The application of its laws in the process of obtaining 
scientific-technical knowledge, the examination of all aspects of war 
and their interconnections and interrelationships, makes it possible 
concretely to reveal and expose contradictions, the forms of the 
struggle of opposites, the transition from quantitative into qualitative 
changes, the mutual relationship of the old and the new, and even 
28
 Barbara P. McCrea, Jack C. Piano, and George Klein, The Soviet and East European Political 
Dictionary, (Santa Barbara, California: ABC-Clio, Inc., 1984), p. 60-61. 
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Comparative Strategy, Vol. 8, No. 3, (1989), p. 317. 
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more correctly to approach exposing the specific laws of war and 
military affairs.30 
As Marshal Ogarkov indicated, the most general laws of dialectic materialism are the 
transformation of quantitative to qualitative changes, the unity and struggle of opposites, 
and the law of negation of the negation. These laws express the universal forms of 
development of the material world and cognition of it. 
The law of the unity and struggle of opposites is based on the fact that the development 
of the objective world and of cognition are carried out through the bifurcation of an entity 
into mutually exclusive opposing moments, aspects, and tendencies; their interrelationship, 
the "struggle" and resolution of contradictions, on the one hand characterizes a given 
system as something integral an qualitatively determined, and on the other hand constitutes 
an internal impulse for the system's change, development, and transformation into a new 
quality.32   In military terms, the appearance of new means of attack has always led to the 
creation of corresponding themes for counteraction. In the final account, this has led to 
finding new means for waging battles and combats, and conduct of operations. Thus, with 
the fast development of tanks, aviation, and submarines, anti-tank, anti-aircraft, and anti- 
submarine weapons and corresponding defense methods were developed. 33 
30
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31
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32
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The law of the reciprocal transformation of quantitative into qualitative changes reveals 
the most general mechanism of development: a change in the quality of an object occurs 
when the accumulation of quantitative changes reaches a certain limit, and a leap ~ that is, 
the replacement of one quality by another - occurs.34   According to Soviet theories, 
quantitative changes in the firepower of weaponry occurred over several hundred years, as 
the musket was replaced by the breechloader, which developed into automatic weapons, of 
many types. But these, and even the V-l and V-2 rockets of World War n, were a 
continuation of the revolution that began with gunpowder. When there are sufficient 
quantitative changes, a qualitative jump occurs ~ a revolution in military affairs.35 
The law of negation of the negation characterizes the direction of development. Its 
basic content is the unity of forward movement, progress, and continuity in development 
and the emergence of a new and relative recurrence of certain previously existing 
elements.36   Thus, when a revolution occurs the old does not disappear all at once; its 
usable parts remain. However, the only "old" that continues to exist is that which finds a 
useful place in the environment created by the new. For example, in the international 
environment created by the presence of nuclear weaponry, nonnuclear or conventional 
military forces still have a place.37 
The specific term Revolution in Military Affairs emerged out of the Soviet's effort to 
develop a doctrine for nuclear weapons following Joseph Stalin's death in 1953. Before 
34
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his death, Stalin dominated Soviet military thinking. If he permitted discussion of the 
possible role of nuclear weapons in warfare it has been kept a tightly held secret in the 
Kremlin's archives.38   At the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956, Nikita Krushchev 
denounced Stalin and called for a new examination of questions of military science.     Not 
surprisingly, when discussion of a doctrine was permitted, works by Western authors were 
read by Soviet strategistc. When the first Soviet books and articles on nuclear warfare 
appeared, they resembled in many respects works published in the United States five to ten 
years previously.40 
Four years later, speaking before the Fourth Session of the Supreme Soviet, Nikita 
Krushchev outlined a new military doctrine. Soviet military doctrine would now emphasize 
the role of nuclear weapons and the Strategic Rocket Forces would become the pre- 
eminent branch of the military. It is interesting to note that true to the Marxist dialectic, the 
Strategic Rocket Forces preceded the deployment of the first four soviet Intercontinental 
Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) by several years.41    It was not enough that the new military 
doctrine be understood by all members of the Soviet Armed Forces; the implications of the 
new doctrine must be part of the ideological conditioning of each individual. In the Soviet 
Union, the Party leaders traditionally used slogans to emphasize to the "masses" changes in 
directions that have been made by the Party of guidelines for personal conduct. To make 
38
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39
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the Soviet Armed Forces, and the population as a whole, fully aware that a major 
transformation had taken place both in the conduct of war and in its consequences, a 
slogan was needed that would signify the change. To be effective a slogan must have 
emotional appeal. The purpose of the Armed Forces, as Soviet ideologists constantly 
affirm, is to protect the "gains of the revolution." In this context, "revolution" is 
synonymous with the revolution of the proletariat. In the Soviet Union, "revolution" is 
good and associated with the Party, which itself came to power through the "glorious 
revolution."42 Thus, "The Revolution in Military Affairs" was selected as the slogan that 
was to explain the changes in warfare and in the Soviet Armed Forces that had resulted 
from the breakthrough in nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.43 
Articles by high ranking officials of the Soviet military to explain the new revolution 
began to appear in professional military publications such as Red Star and Communist of 
the Armed Forces. In an article that originally appeared in the February 15, 1963 issue of 
Red Star, General Lieutenant of Aviation N. A. Sbitov described the result of the new 
nuclear capabilities: 
The revolution in military affairs is an accomplished fact. It led 
to basic quantitative and qualitative changes in the military-technological 
base of the Armed Forces and in its structure. It marked a revolution in 
the methods of waging war, a revolution in the theory of military art 
and actual combat training of the troops. ** 
Scott and Scott, The Armed Forces of the Soviet Union, p. 47. 
William R. Kintner and Harriet Fast Scott, The Nuclear Revolution in Soviet Military Affairs, (Norman, 
Oklahoma: The University of Oklahoma Press, 1968), p. 4. 
N. A. Sbitiov, "The Revolution in Military Affairs and its Results," in Problems of the Revolution in 
Military affairs, ed. Colonel P. M. Derevyanko (Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1965) in Kintner and 
Scott, The Nuclear Revolution in Soviet Military Affairs, p. 27. 
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Soviet Minister of Defense, Rodion Ya. Malinovsky, expressed similar sentiments 
regarding the nuclear revolution in an article titled, The Revolution in Military Affairs and 
the Task of the Military Press. However, in addition to describing the current nuclear 
revolution (the first quote), he asserted additional revolutions were possible (the second 
quote): 
Fundamental qualitative changes have taken place in all the basic 
areas of military activity: armaments, organization, combat methods, 
and methods of training and educating personnel. This has been caused, 
first of all, by the wide introduction of the nuclear rocket weapon and 
new equipment assuring its use. 
But new weapons are both being perfected and being substituted 
by even newer. One cannot exclude the possibility of the appearance 
of a weapon that is new in principle.46 
In 1977, Marshall of the Soviet Union Nikolai Ogarkov was selected as Chief of the 
General Staff of the Armed Forces and USSR First Deputy Minister of Defense. Shortly 
after this promotion, evidence began to surface that Soviet military doctrine was beginning 
to change to one with less emphasis on nuclear weapons and more toward advanced 
conventional munitions. Evidence of this change includes Leonid Brezhnev's 1977 Tula 
address in which he stated that the USSR was "not striving for superiority with the aim of 
delivering a first strike. Acceptance of the American concept of Mutual Assured 
45
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Destruction (MAD), or assured unacceptable retaliation, followed during the next few 
years. Coincidentally, Ogarkov began to postulate that the United States was developing 
the capability to conduct a protracted military action using only conventional weapons. 
The following quotes from Ogarkov illustrate his vision of future warfare and the next 
RMA. The first quote is from 1982. The second is from 1985. 
A profound, and in the full sense revolutionary turn is taking 
place in military affairs in our time in connection with the development 
of nuclear weapons, rapid advances in electronics, development of 
weapons based on new principles of physics, as well as in connection 
with extensive qualitative improvements of conventional weapons4 ~47 
The fourth revolution, one based on advances in sensors and 
computing systems that would give conventional weapons an 
effectiveness equivalent to nuclear weapons.48 
3. U.S. RMA Concepts 
During the 1960s and early 1970s analysts and strategists in the U.S. and Western 
governments did not pickup on the all encompassing nature of the Soviet term "revolution 
in military affairs". There are several reasons for this: First, because the term RMA was 
initially used to describe how nuclear weapons had changed warfare, the term became 
almost synonymous with nuclear war. Second, it was easy for Western analysts to see 
nuclear weapons as revolutionary and that the nature of warfare had completely changed - 
but not in the sense of the Marxist dialectic or as a general principle for analyzing warfare. 
Nikolay V. Ogarkov, Vsegda v gotovnosti kzaschite otechestva (Always Ready to Defend the 
Fatherland) (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1982), p. 31. 
Nikolay V. Ogarkov, Istoriya uchit bditelnosti (History Teaches Vigilance) (Moscow: Voenzidat, 48 
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Third, because many of the initial Soviet books and documents concerning nuclear warfare 
borrowed from works previously published by Western authors, it was relatively easy to 
dismiss the concept as the Soviet spin on previous analysis and conclusions. Lastly, most 
Western scholars thought that the Cuban missile confrontation in 1962 and Khrushchev's 
ouster in 1964 had made Soviet military theoretical writings, such as Military Strategy, 
obsolete. Very little attention was given to Soviet military thought until the mid-1970s.49 
During the late 1970s and early 1980s, defense analysts in the United States began to 
appreciate the concepts of an emerging RMA that were being discussed by Soviet officials. 
Support for the concepts was strongest in the Pentagon's think-tank ~ the Office of Net 
Assessment (ONA). This interest was heightened because these concepts correlated to the 
doctrine and precision guided munitions (PGMs) that were beginning to emerge from 
within the U.S. military. On 25 March, 1981, the U.S. Army's Training and Doctrine 
Command (TRADOC) issued a preliminary statement of the future-oriented battlefield 
titled, The AirLand Battle and Corps 86, TRADOC pamphlet 525-5*   Approximately 
one year later, the basis for doctrinal changes in how the U.S. military would fight was 
released. It emphasized close air and land coordination, deep strikes to prevent first, 
second, and subsequent echelons from reaching the scene of the battle, and — most 
significant - the use of new technologies to hit targets previously assigned to nuclear 
weapons. In doing so, it [allegedly] reduced the chances of nuclear confrontation. 
49
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During the mid-1980s until after Desert Storm the concept continued to generate only 
mild interest throughout most of the defense community. The Soviets were still the 
unquestioned enemy. Relatively minor engagements in Grenada, Lebanon, Libya, Iran, 
and Panama provided only glimpses of the what the new technologies were capable of. 
In fact, arguements were made against using some of the new weapons in third world 
scenarios. For example, concerns existed regarding the potential for proliferation of the 
highly specialized guidance systems used in Tomahawk cruise missiles.52 
Following the U.S. led coalition's dramatic victory over Iraq, interest in the RMA 
concept began to grow exponentially. Dramatic examples of precision strike weapons and 
warfighting capabilities were televised almost instantly around the world. Almost no place 
within the borders of Iraq was immune. A few precision guided munitions time and time 
again destroyed buildings that previously would have required an entire squadron of 
aircraft. The Iraqi Army of several hundred thousand soldiers was defeated in a matter of 
weeks with minimal losses. Surely this represented a revolutionary change in warfare 
from World War H. Secretary of Defense, William Perry, remarked about the excitement 
of change brought on by the Gulf War, "Where once technology had to be pushed at the 
services, now they eagerly seek it." 53 
The already growing interest in the RMA concept was fueled by the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. No longer was the primary enemy and its capabilities clearly identifiable and 
52 
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well understood. A strong desire for historical guidance existed on how to do long-range 
strategic planning when no real enemy appeared to exist. Questions arose such as, "What 
capabilities would be needed in the future," and "What threats are likely to emerge?" 
Additionally, the military began to seek answers on how to further exploit the dramatic 
capabilities demonstrated during the Gulf War when the country was turning its attention 
inward and reducing resources allocated to the armed services. The concept of a 
Revolution in Military Affairs offered a framework to study change in military capabilities 
and explore the lessons of numerous historical examples. 
D. THE FUTURE RMA 
Since being fully adopted by Western analysts, the concept of a RMA has lost most, if 
not all of its Marxist connotations. In the United States, RMAs are not associated with the 
teachings of Marx and dialectic materialism. From a historical standpoint, the concept 
simply describes fundamental changes in technology, doctrine, or organization that render 
existing methods of warfare obsolete. Two themes predominate speculation of future 
RMAs. The first is integrating advanced conventional weapons with improved 
intelligence gathering and processing capabilities. The second is known as "information 
warfare." 
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1. Brilliant Conventional Weapons 
The concept of RMA has taken on many futuristic connotations due to the extensive 
number of articles and books that have emerged since Desert Storm. Several of the visions 
put forth in these works have become somewhat synonymous with RMA: 
Future weapons will be able to strike enemy forces at great 
distances. In mid- or high-intensity combat, it may not always be 
necessary to physically occupy key terrain on the ground, vital airspace, 
or critical choke points at sea in order to control them. While wars 
will still be won only when soldiers occupy the enemy's territory, it 
may not be necessary in every case to 'close with' the enemy in order 
to destroy him.54 
Admiral David Jeremiah 
Our C3I (command, control, communications, and intelligence) 
loop from decision to action is expected to be compressed by orders 
of magnitude ~ increasing the tempo of operations such that we are 
well within the command cycle of any adversary.55 
General Sullivan 
By 2005 we could have the technical capacity of sensing roughly 
90% of everything of interest in a 200 by 200 mile area.56 
Admiral William Owens 
Space assets facilitate effective command and control and enhance 
the joint utilization of our land, sea, and air forces Interactive 
information sharing is key to  modern battlefield success.57 
National Military Strategy (1995) 
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In addition, each branch of military service has issued its own vision of how it will fight 
in the future with the benefit of revolutionary changes. The Army has published "Force 
XXI" for the 21st century, the Navy offers "Forward . . . From the Sea," the Marines have 
their companion piece in "Operational Maneuver... From the Sea," and the Air Force has 
issued "Global Reach, Global Power."58 Admiral Owens in the May 1995 issue of 
Proceedings, comments on the views of the individual services on future warfare. He 
states, "The visions they sketch are remarkably similar. Each points toward the capacity to 
use military force with greater precision, less risk, and more effectiveness."59 He also 
observed that each relies on three areas of technology: 
- Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) 
- Advanced command, control, communications, computers and intelligence (C4I) 
- Precision-guided munitions (PGMs) 
These are the basic "ingredients" of what the U.S. defense establishment envisions as 
the future RMA. However, the implications of combining intelligence (J2), 
communications (J6), and the warfighter (J3) have yet to be worked out. 
2. Information Warfare 
Information warfare (IW) is another possible area that RMA possibilities are postulated. 
A current definition of IW is: 
58
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Actions taken to achieve information superiority in support of 
national military strategy by affecting adversary information and 
information systems while leveraging and protecting our information 
and information systems.61 
This definition covers the entire spectrum of how the political, economic, social and 
military structures of a given country receive and interpret data. The victim of IW may 
not even realize their data gathering systems, and ultimately their decisions, are being 
manipulated. The enemy could potentially be anyone from a terrorist group or subnational 
organization to a super-power. 
The military component of information warfare is command and control warfare 
(C2W). Five components make up the foundation of an effective C2W strategy:62 
1) Operational security 
Operational Security (OPSEC) is the process of denying 
adversaries information about friendly capabilities and intentions by 
identifying, controlling, and protecting indicators associated with 
planning and conducting military operations. The goal of OPSEC is 
improved effectiveness in military operations. 63 
2) Military deception 
Military Deception (MILDEC) are those actions executed to 
mislead foreign decision-makers causing them to derive and accept 
desired appreciations of military capabilities, intentions, operations, 
or other activities that evoke foreign actions that contribute to the 
originator's objectives.64 
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3) Psychological operations 
Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) are planned operations 
involving the use of mass media techniques and/or actions to convey 
selected information indicators to foreign audiences to influence their 
attitudes, emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the 
behavior of the foreign government, organizations, groups, and 
individuals.65 
4) Electronic warfare 
Electronic Warfare (EW) is any military action involving the 
use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic 
spectrum or to attack the enemy. The three major subdivisions within 
electronic warfare are electronic attack (EA), electronic protection (EP), 
and electronic warfare support (ES).66 Electronic attack, formerly 
known as ECM, involves the use of electromagnetic or directed energy to 
attack personnel, facilities or equipment with the intent of degrading, 
neutralizing or destroying enemy combat capability. Electronic protection, 
formerly known as ECCM, involves actions taken to protect personnel 
facilities and equipment from any affects of friendly or enemy employment 
of electronic warfare. Electronic warfare support, formerly known as ESM, 
involves actions taken to search for, intercept, identify and locate sources of 
intentional and unintentional radiated electromagnetic energy. 
5) Physical destruction 
Physical destruction is the permanent disabling or incapacitating 
of enemy C2-equipment or C2-systems such that the systems or 
equipment are no longer a threat to friendly forces. Careful coordination 
must be maintained with both PSYOPS and MLDEC to ensure that a 
target being manipulated is not destroyed.6 
3. Conclusions 
Both of these potential RMAs involve new and emerging concepts of warfare which 
will require new skills, command structures, and organizations. In conjunction with new 
capabilities, many questions regarding the nature of warfare will have to be answered. 
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Such questions include the following: If these areas of warfare do develop, what are the 
implications during both peacetime and war?  Will the tools for diplomatic signaling 
change?   Can the influence on events currently exerted by military presence be 
accomplished from thousands of miles away or in a virtual world? Where will the 
battlefield be? How will victory be determined? All such questions must be satisfactorily 
answered before a RMA in either of these areas can emerge. 
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III. THE INTELLIGENCE MISSION 
Professor R. V. Jones, the principal scientific intelligence advisor to British Prime 
Minister Winston Churchill during World War n, listed ascertaining the development of 
new weapons and improvement of existing ones by other countries as the number one 
objective of the Scientific Intelligence Service.1   The goal of the U.S. intelligence 
community regarding a potentially hostile revolution in military affairs should be identical, 
but with an expanded and more general mission of ascertaining the development of all new 
military capabilities ~ not just the capabilities of weapons. In Sherman Kent's 1949 classic 
book on intelligence tided, Strategic Intelligence, he indicated that the intelligence of future 
capabilities, termed the speculative-evaluative form of intelligence, was vital to national 
security: 
Information to be acquired deals with the future and its possibilities 
and probabilities: how another country may shape its internal forces 
to service its foreign policy or strategy; how it may try to use these 
strengths against us, when, where, and with what effectiveness. 
An examination of the intelligence process, required attributes of good intelligence, and the 
critical mission of alerting the decision-maker to potential capabilities and actions by hostile 
countries — commonly termed "Indications and Warning" intelligence ~ will suggest a 
method for accomplishing Professor Jones' and Doctor Kent's objective. 
1
 R. V. Jones, The Wizard War, (New York: Coward, McCann & Geoghegan, Inc., 1978), p. 74. 
2
 Sherman Kent, Strategic Intelligence, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1951), p. 7. 
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A. TYPES OF INTELLIGENCE 
1. Definition 
The term "intelligence" has been defined by different authors in many different ways. 
Von Clausewitz, in On War, equated intelligence to information: 
By "intelligence " we mean every sort of information about the enemy and his 
country - the basis, in short, of our plans and operations.3 
The United States Navy goes one step further and differentiates between "finished" 
intelligence and "raw" intelligence. Additionally, the Navy's definition strongly implies that 
intelligence must come by way of a formal organization and process: 
Intelligence is the product resulting from the collection, exploitation, 
processing, integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available 
information concerning foreign countries or areas.'' 
Joint Pub 2-0, the U.S. military's Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations, 
does not give a general definition of intelligence. Instead, it defines three subsets of 
intelligence: Strategic intelligence, Operational intelligence, and Tactical intelligence. 
Better definitions and descriptions of these terms are found in the doctrine for U.S. Navy 
which is titled, Naval Doctrine Publication 2: Naval Intelligence. 
Strategic Intelligence is required for the formation of policy and 
military plans at national and international levels. At the strategic level, 
intelligence is oriented toward national objectives and supports the 
formulation of policies and determination of priorities. Strategic 
intelligence focuses first on discerning the capabilities and intentions of 
potential adversaries as well as considering the strategic intentions of allies 
and other potential multinational partners. Strategic intelligence plays a 
central role in identifying an adversary's center of gravity.5 
Carl Von Clauswitz, On War, 21st ed. (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1976) 
4
 Chief of Naval Operations, Naval Doctrine Publication 2: Naval Intelligence, (Washington, D.C., 
Department of the Navy, 1994), p. 4. 
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Operational Intelligence is required for planning operations 
within regional theaters or areas of operations. It concentrates on 
intelligence collection, identification, location, and analysis to support 
the operational level of warfare, which includes identifying an adversary's 
operational critical vulnerabilities. Further, it assists the  commander 
in deciding how best to employ forces while minimizing risk. 
Tactical Intelligence is intelligence required for planning and 
conducting tactical operations at the component or unit level. It focuses 
on a potential adversary's capabilities, his immediate intentions, and the 
environment. It is oriented more toward combat than long-range planning. 
As the three different subsets of intelligence imply, the value of an individual piece 
of intelligence depends on the purpose. For example, intelligence on the disposition of an 
enemy mechanized unit located on the other side of a ridge is a critical piece of information 
for the unit level tank commander. The same intelligence is only a small piece of the 
complete enemy force disposition that the theater commander must posses. For the 
President, who must focus on national objectives, the location of a single enemy unit is far 
too detailed to be useful in making strategic decisions. Evident from this example is that, in 
general, as the level of detail required by the consumer becomes more precise, the scope of 
intelligence gets broader. Tactical intelligence is needed when combat operations are close 
at hand or ongoing. Strategic intelligence is used to plan years and decades into the future. 
It is the most applicable level of intelligence to employ in examining the possibility of 
detecting a potentially hostile RMA. 
5
 Ibid., p. 6. 
6
 Ibid., p. 6. 
7
 Ibid., p. 6. 
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B. THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE 
Although types of intelligence and ultimate consumer can be very different, the process 
of intelligence production does not vary. This process can be broken down into a series of 
interrelated activities termed the "intelligence cycle" or "intelligence process." 8 
Figure 1 illustrates the process through which the commander levies intelligence 
requirements, information is collected and converted into intelligence, and intelligence is 
disseminated to users. 
Figure 1. The Intelligence Cycle 
8
 The "Intelligence cycle" is described in several publications with little variance. Those pulbications 
include: Jeffrey T. Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Community, (New York: Ballinger Publishing Co., 
1989), p. 3-4; Authur S. Hulnick, "The Intelligence Producer-Policy Consumer Linkage," Studies in 
Intelligence, Vol. 29, No. 4, (Winter 1985), p. 75-76.; Chief of Naval Operations, Naval Docrine 
Publication 2: Naval Intelligence, (Washington, DC: Naval Doctrine Command, 1994), p. 24-26; 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations, 
(Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chairman: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1993), p. II-3 -11-10.; Herbert E. 
Meyer,Real World Intelligence, (Friday Harbor, WA: Storm King Press, 1991), p. 33. 
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This cycle normally consists of five steps: planning and directing, collection, 
processing, production, and dissemination. This cycle greatly simplifies a dynamic and 
complex process, but it is useful to illustrate how the intelligence process works. 
Naturally, intelligence efforts do not always flow sequentially through the cycle. For 
example, a request for imagery generates planning and direction, but may not involve new 
collection if the request can be satisfied from archival imagery. 
1. Direction and Planning 
In the Direction phase, the commander must identify and prioritize his policy 
objectives. This must be done to ensure the information being collected is relevant to a 
particular problem. Sherman Kent addressed the problem of collecting relevant 
information in his 1951 book Strategic Intelligence, "Intelligence is not knowledge for 
knowledge's sake alone.. . intelligence is knowledge for the practical matter of taking 
action.   Fulfillment of this function requires that the intelligence staff know a great deal 
about the issue which is under discussion "9  If the intelligence staff is not providing 
relevant intelligence to the policy-maker, useful information needed to make crucial 
decisions will either be sought elsewhere or done without. Neither option optimizes the use 
of assets or increases the likelihood of successful policies. In short, intelligence must be 
relevant to the issues at hand. 
1
 Sherman Kent, Strategic Intelligence, p. 180. 
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A potential downfall exists with a close relationship between the policy-maker and 
intelligence staff. If the intelligence staff becomes too close to the policy-maker, it is 
possible that they will cease to objective. Once objectivity is lost, no one is capable of 
authoritatively telling the policy-maker that the current course is not producing the desired 
results. General William Donovan, who headed the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) 
during World War n, recognized this potential problem in a 1946 speech when he stated, 
"Intelligence must be independent of the people it serves so that the material it obtains will 
not be slanted or distorted by the views of the people directing operations." 10 The absolute 
necessity for intelligence to be both relevant and objective requires a delicate balancing act. 
The second necessary element is the Planning stage. Because resources are limited and 
many different decision-makers have unique intelligence requirements, efforts must be 
made to optimize the available resources and answer the most critical questions. 
Identifying the critical questions or essential elements of information (EEIs) is not as easy 
as it may sound. In his book Real World Intelligence, Herbert Meyer recognizes this 
difficult problem: 
Figuring out the right things to know about - which is to say the 
things that will directiy help you reach a particular objective ~ is one 
of the trickiest, least understood, and most underrated jobs in the 
world. What's required to this job is not so much an expertise in one 
or another specific subject or issue, but rather the ability to recognize 
what factors will influence that specific subject or issue.11 
10
 Major General William J. Donovan, Vital Speches, Vol. XII, No. 14, (1 May 1946), p. 248 in Arthur S. 
Hulnick, "The Intelligence Producer-Policy Consumer Linkage," Studies in Intelligence Vol 29 No 4 
(Winter 1985), p. 72. ' '     '  ' 
11
 Hebert E. Meyer, Real World Intelligence, p. 33-34. 
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For example, if the specific objective is at least 72 hours warning of an Iraqi attack on 
Kuwait, one of the factors that could influence this goal is the readiness status of the Iraqi 
elite Republican Guards. A single EEI would be the status (in storage or lined up departing 
the compound) and location of assigned vehicles such as tanks and armored personnel 
carriers. After the EEIs are identified and prioritized, a particular collection asset can be 
tasked with obtaining the needed data. This is the meat of a collection plan. If an EEI can 
not be satisfied, the decision-maker must be notified so that additional measures can be 
taken to obtain the information or limit the consequences of this lack of knowledge. 
Planning does not end with the identification of how the information will be collected, it 
includes the identification of who is responsible for analyzing the received data and how 
the new intelligence will get to the consumer. 
2. Collection 
Jeffrey Richelson in The U.S. Intelligence Community defines collection as, "The 
purposeful acquisition of any information that might be desired by analysts, consumers, or 
operators."12 The U.S. Navy outlines how an individual commander would use an 
intelligence organization to obtain a specific piece of information: 
Collection involves tasking organic (an asset or capability permanently 
assigned to the tasking command), attached, and supporting collection 
resources to gather information. The collection process determines what 
will be — and what will not be — available to support decision-making. 
Since few collection requirements can be met fully by organic assets 
alone, collection resources available at the theater and national level will 
normally be tasked as well. To do this effectively, the intelligence staff 
must know the capabilities and limitations of available collection resources, 
must understand the requirements validation process to obtain desired 
12
 Jeffrey T. Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Community, p. 2. 
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collection approval, and must identify the collection resources that can 
contribute to fulfilling mission requirements.13 
No matter the means of collecting data, the reason for its collection must never be 
forgotten. Data is needed to assist the policy-maker's in achieving specific objectives. 
3. Processing 
Processing is the conversion of collected information into a form suitable for producing 
usable intelligence, such as translating foreign languages, developing film from tactical 
reconnaissance aircraft, generating hard- or soft-copy images provided by electro-optical or 
infrared sensors, and converting raw electronic intelligence data into a standard message 
format suitable for automatic handling. Timeliness and accuracy are especially relevant 
during processing. 
4. Production 
This step is also known as "analysis." It is where a determination is made as to what 
the raw data means. All the skills of the analysts are used to fuse the bits of information 
into a clear, concise, and coherent picture of the situation. Meyer describes the process as 
follows: 
Transforming raw information into finished intelligence is itself a 
step-by-step process. You study the raw material, argue and debate 
what the material means with your intelligence colleagues, check and 
re-check the facts, resolve the inevitable inconsistencies in the data, 
question your original assumptions, assure that as many acknowledged 
experts as possible have been consulted, develop some tentative theses, 
and then test these theses time and again until you are confident that 
the theses are valid.14 
13
 Chief of Naval Operations, Naval Doctrine Publication 2: Naval Intelligence, p. 25. 
14
 Hebert E. Meyer,/W World Intelligence, p. 41-42. 
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The U.S. Navy echoes the theme of incorporating numerous sources of data to ensure 
accurate and complete analysis: 
Intelligence production is the integration, analysis, evaluation, and 
interpretation of information from all available sources into tailored, 
usable intelligence. A key principle in production is the fusion of 
information from various sources to form a complete and accurate 
product. Fusion is essential for an effective intelligence production 
process that accurately reflects and supports the commander's prioritized 
essential elements of information.1 
5. Dissemination 
There is one word to describe an intelligence outfit that has identified what policy- 
makers need to know, collected all the raw information accurately and efficiently, done a 
careful and thorough job of analysis and evaluation, and in due course reached sensible, 
accurate, even brilliant conclusions, judgments, and projections. The word is: useless. 
Unless the result of the previous four steps reaches the person responsible for making the 
decision, the effort was for naught. As noted in the U.S. military's Joint Doctrine for 
Intelligence Support to Operators, "Intelligence is disseminated in many forms, using a 
variety of means. Intelligence can take the form of verbal reports (face-to-face, and/or 
telephone, and video exchanges), documents (reports, studies, analyses, estimates, and 
assessments), graphic products (maps, overlays, charts, hardcopy imagery, videotape, 
motion picture film, 35mm slides, digital images, and view graphs), and information in 
15
 Chief of Naval Operations, Naval Doctrine Publication 2: Naval Intelligence, p. 26. 
16
 Hebert E. Meyer, Real World Intelligence, p. 44. 
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intelligence data bases." 17   The primary factor in determining which form should be used 
is the desire of policy-maker. Obviously this factor will be different for different 
individuals. For example, some individuals prefer a verbal brief while others assimilate 
information better by reading a report and mulling over the implications. Intelligence is a 
support function - information should be delivered to the customer when, where, and how 
it is needed. 
The delivery of an intelligence product is not the end of the process. Again, the U.S. 
Navy recognizes this fact: 
Intelligence personnel must ensure that the product is actually used. 
This is a particular obligation of intelligence personnel who are members 
of operational staffs. They are in the best position to demonstrate the 
value of intelligence products to commanders and other staff members. 
Second, intelligence personnel must see to it that dissemination is refined 
by gathering feedback from the commander or other users to ensure that 
intelligence requirements have been satisfied and the finished intelligence 
products are usable. If not, the intelligence staff must take corrective 
measures to meet the needs of the commander.18 
C. ATTRIBUTES OF EFFECTIVE INTELLIGENCE 
Effective intelligence has several mutually supportive attributes or qualities. In certain 
cases these qualities can appear as competing goals. For example, although both 
thoroughness and timeliness are attributes of any intelligence product, a goal of 
thoroughness for any one product could actually hinder timeliness. To be effective 
17
 Chairman of The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations, p. II-l 0. 
18
 Chief of Naval Operations, Naval Doctrine Publication 2: Naval Intelligence,?. 26. 
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intelligence must strike a proper balance among the following — sometimes conflicting — 
attributes:19 
1. Timeliness 
Intelligence should be timely enough to support policy-making or decision-making, to 
enhance the prospect of mission accomplishment. Timeliness is most essential during the 
formulation of the commander's estimate and when handling highly perishable data 
normally called Indications and Warning (I & W) intelligence. To ensure that timeliness 
requirements are met, the commander must prioritize his information needs. 
2. Objectivity 
From the facts on hand, the intelligence analyst must be free to assess and report the 
situation without the influence of bias, distortion, or political constraint. Intelligence 
analysts should be meticulous in their efforts to discount preconceived notions and not 
allow these to influence, much less drive, the intelligence effort. The following quote from 
General Colin L. Powell, former Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, describes how intelligence 
should be presented: "Tell me what you know... tell me what you don't know ... tell me 
what you think... always distinguish which is which." 
19
 These attributes can be found in a number of publications to include Serman Kent, Strategic 
Intelligence; Helene Boatner, "The Evaluation of Intelligence," Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 28, No. 2, 
(Summer 1984), p. 67.; Chairman of The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to 
Operations, p. IV-19 - IV-23.; The following description of attributes is from Naval Doctrine Publication 
2: Naval Intelligence, p. 18-20. 
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3. Usability 
A commander needs intelligence that is easy to understand and apply to operational 
decisions. Usability demand timeliness, relevance, and proper format or form. The speed 
and complexity both of modern threats and our own telecommunications systems place a 
premium on rapid intelligence dissemination. Commanders need this intelligence in time to 
react to threats and make better decisions. 
4. Availability 
To support the commander's planning and operations, intelligence should be available 
when and where needed. Availability requires foresight, and ability to predict, a clear 
understanding of objectives, and thorough intelligence training. In order to respond to 
rapidly emerging intelligence requirements, the intelligence officer should anticipate, 
collect, produce, and store information. We must be able to receive current, meaningful, 
appropriately classified intelligence to support changing operational requirements rapidly. 
Recognizing the need to protect sensitive intelligence sources and methods, we must guard 
against excessively restrictive classification of intelligence, which would deny it to the 
commander or operator who truly needs it. Many intelligence items can be "sanitized" by 




Thorough intelligence contributes directly to successful combat planning and execution. 
Proper identification and prioritization of the commander's essential elements of 
information help clarify the scope and detail of the intelligence required. The intelligence 
effort should give us the information we need -- nothing more, nothing less. Since the 
intelligence picture never will be complete, the commander should be aware of gaps in 
available information. By recognizing both the known and the unknown, a commander 
can apply appropriate judgment to reduce risk. 
6. Accuracy 
Intelligence should be factually correct and convey sound estimates of the adversary's 
intentions and capabilities. Accurate intelligence reduces uncertainty, thus increasing the 
commander's confidence in his understanding of the battlespace. comparison of 
information received from multiple sources improves the ability to verify information and 
reduces susceptibility to deception. The dissemination process must not reduce accuracy. 
7. Relevance 
Intelligence should pertain directly to the operations at hand and to the level of 
command for which it is intended. For example, the commanding officer of a destroyer 
conducting maritime interdiction operations would find it important to learn that a 
merchant ship with a history or arms smuggling is entering his area of responsibility. The 
National Command Authorities might find the same intelligence somewhat less relevant. If 
intelligence does not support the needs of the intended user, it has little value. 
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D. INDICATIONS AND WARNING 
1. The watch dog 
The subset of intelligence designed to alert the intelligence analyst, and ultimately the 
policy-maker, of a possible surprise attack is called indications and warning (I & W) 
intelligence. The goal of this type of intelligence is to act as a perfect watch dog.20 When 
potential danger is near or a situation that the policy-maker needs to know about is 
developing an alert is sounded and the nature of the problem is identified. False alarms 
are held to absolute minimum to ensure that every alarm is treated with the attention it 
deserves.    The United States Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations defines 
Indications and Warning as follows: 
Those intelligence activities intended to detect and report time-sensitive 
intelligence on foreign developments that could involve a threat to the 
United States or allied military, political or economic interest or to U.S. 
citizens abroad. Indications and Warning (I & W) includes forewarning 
of adversary actions or intentions; the imminence of nuclear or non-nuclear 
attack on the United States, its overseas forces, or terrorist attacks; and 
other similar events. The I & W process anticipates hostile operations and 
provides sufficient warning to enable U.S. or allied efforts to preempt, 
counter, or moderate such actions.21 
2. Sufficient Warning 
The term "sufficient warning" is necessarily ambiguous because it will be unique to a 
particular situation and the individual decision-maker. In a generic sense, "sufficient 
warning" means time enough for the decision-maker to gain an appreciation of the problem 
20
 R. V. Jones, "Intelligence and Command," Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 31, No. 3, (Fall 1987), p. 43-45. 
21 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations, p. VI-6. 
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and have a fiill arsenal of options to counter it. The amount of actual time is dependent on 
the individual circumstances. The 6 October 1973 surprise attack on Israel by the Arabs 
and the 2 April 1982 invasion of the Falkland Islands by Argentina illustrate the 
consequences and differences in determining, "What is sufficient warning?" 
On 5 October, Israeli intelligence officers still estimated a low probability of Egyptian 
attack and continued to ascribe Syrian concentrations to defensive plans.22 By the morning 
of 6 October, only hours before hostilities commenced, intelligence indicated that an Arab 
attack was imminent. The 48 hours warning of an attack the military had counted on was 
not available and negligible time existed for concerted diplomatic initiatives to prevent the 
attack. As a result, the attack did take place and the Egyptians enjoyed unexpected early 
successes. 
In the case of the Britain and the Falklands conflict, unlike Israel and the Yom Kippur 
War, two days warning prior to the invasion did not make any difference.      In fact, the 
first British naval units did not set sail for the South Atlantic until 72 hours after the 
invasion. The first British military response took place three weeks later when the 
Argentine submarine Santa Fe was attacked. 
22
 Michael I. Handel, Perception, Deception, and Surprise: The Case of the Yom Kippur War, Jerusalem 
Paper 19 (Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations), p.37,58 in 
Richard K. Betts, Surprise Attack, (Washington, D. C: The Brookings Institution, 1982), p. 76. 
23
 The British and Argentine dispute over the Falkland and South Georgian Islands has been ongoing since 
1820. However, tensions increased after the Argentine military junta, led by General Lopoldo Galtieri, came 
to power in December 1981. Negotiations through the Winter and early Spring provided no satisfactory 
solutions. By 31 March, the British government believed invasion was imminent within 48 hours -- which is 
when it actually happened. A full accounting of the Falklands crisis can be found in Lawrence Freedman 
and Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse, Signals of War, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
1991) and The Falklands Campaign: The Lessons, which was presented to the British Parliament by the 
Secretary of State for Defence in December 1982 and printed by Her Majesty's Stationery Office in 1986. 
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The previously discussed cog of "dissemination" in the intelligence cycle and attributes 
of "timeliness" and "usability" are particularly relevant to providing sufficient warning. 
From a RMA perspective, the role of intelligence is to warn decision-makers if new 
weapons, organizational structures, or doctrines are being developed that could render 
current means of conducting warfare obsolete. 
E. THE WARNING PROCESS 
1. The Warning Cycle 
In 1983, John F. McCreary outlined a six-step cycle to describe the cognitive steps of 
the warning process.24 This description also delineates responsibility for the performance 
of each step in the process. 
Intelligence Decision-maker 
1. Recognition 5. Evaluation 
2. Validation 6. Action 
3. Definition 
4. Communication 
Recognition is the first step in the warning process and arguably the most difficult.   Not 
only must an anomaly be noticed, but a determination that a change from previous 
observations is significant and represents a potential harm must be made. 
24
 John F. McCreaiy, "Warning Cycles," Studies in Intelligence,Vol. 27, No. 3, (Fall 1983), p. 71-79. 
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Validation involves confirmation of the perceived anomaly to determine that not only what 
was noticed actually occurred, but that the interpretation of the data is correct. An 
incorrect interpretation of the data may or may not be a direct result of enemy intentions. 
Definition is the process of filling in the blanks about a danger, as to its nature, gravity, 
probability of occurrence, timing, and duration. It may not be possible to fill in all of the 
blanks but each blank must be considered. 
Communication is the second most critical step in the process. If the problem is accurately 
defined but not relayed in a coherent and understandable manner to the decision-maker, 
the previous effort will be for naught. 
The evaluation step shifts the focus of the process from the intelligence analyst to the 
decision-maker. Options are discussed as to what actions, if any, must be taken to solve 
the problem. 
Actions authorized by the decision-maker are taken to address the problem. The 
intelligence analyst must now determine if the actions had the desired result, and if not ~ 
why. 
2. Surprise and Intelligence 
From a military standpoint, the advantages gained by a surprise attack and the 
achievement of a revolution in military affairs are almost identical. As noted by Michael 
Handel in War, Strategy, and Intelligence, "A successful unanticipated attack will facilitate 
the destruction of a sizable portion of the enemy's forces at a lower cost to the 
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attacker "     The primary goal of every RMA is to increase combat effectiveness so 
that victory is more likely.   However, unlike a surprise attack, a RMA does not require an 
ignorant or deceived enemy to be successful. It only requires the enemy to be unable to 
counter the new capabilities.   An examination of the relationship between intelligence and 
strategic surprise will reveal lessons that can be transferred to the effort of recognizing 
anomalies and detecting a potentially hostile RMA. 
a. Information Quality 
Ephraim Kam, in his book Surprise Attack, identifies three factors that cause 
nations to be surprised.26 The first is the quality of information and data available for 
judging and predicting enemy behavior. The usual lack of direct evidence pertaining to the 
enemy's intentions and the ambiguous nature of the available warning indicators are critical 
factors that make it very difficult to assess correctly both the intentions and capabilities of 
the opponent.   These factors have been described as "the fog of peace."   Although the 
collection of good information is absolutely essential, studies of military surprise reveal that 
evidence of enemy intentions and capabilities did exist prior to almost every attack.27 The 
true challenge for the intelligence analyst is to separate the true signal from the background 
noise. 
25
 Michael I. Handel, War, Strategy, and Intelligence, (Totowa, N.J.: Frank Cass and Company Ltd   1989") 
p. 229. h 
Ephraim Kam, Surprise Attack, (Cambridge, Mass: Havard University Press, 1988), p. 7-37. 
7
 This conclusion is supported by a large volumn of analysis to include Richard K. Berts, Surprise Attack 
Lessons for Defense Planning, (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1982), p. 87-95.; Michael I. 
Handel, War, Strategy, and Intelligence, p. 229-274.; and Ephraim Kam, Surprise Attack, p. 7-37. 
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b. Preconceived Perceptions 
The second factor is the persistence of preconceived perceptions, even in the face 
of contradictory evidence. This is a significant human frailty that must be accounted for. 
Historical examples of this situation are numerous: 
The Joint Congressional Committee that investigated Ihe Japanese 
attack on Pearl Harbor noted, "The consideration overshadowing all 
others in the minds of the Hawaiian commanders was the belief and the 
conviction that Pearl Harbor would not be attacked  
Robert E. Merriam on the December 1944 surprise German 
counter-offensive known as the Battle of the Bulge stated, "We were 
fooled because we were overconfident and certain that we had the 
Germans on the run. Intelligence officers, who were supposed to be 
born pessimists, were vying with each other for the honor of devastating 
the German war machine with words." M 
Before the 1973 war the Israelis felt mat their army was so superior 
to the Arabs' that for the Arabs to launch an attack would be sheer 
madness. This was not only an intelligence assessment; it was shared by 
the political and military leadership, both the coalition and opposition 
parties, and in fact almost everyone.30 
The ambiguous and often conflicting nature of the incoming data allows the assimilation of 
the new information into the old perception of reality. In addition, the Yom Kippur War 
example illustrates that even if the preconceived perception is essentially correct -- the 
Arabs would lose if they initiated a war with Israel - adequate warning is not guaranteed. 
28
 LTC Robert R. Glass and LTC Phillip B. Davidson, Intelligence is for Commanders, (Hanisburg, PA.: 
Military Service Publishing Co., 1949), p. introdution in Robert W. Williams, "Commanders and Surprise," 
Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 26, No. 3, (Fall 1982) p. 11. 
29
 Robert E. Merriam, Dark December, (Chicago: Davis Publishing Co., 1947), p. 225 in Robert W. 
Williams, "Commanders and Surprise," Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 26,Uo. 3, (Fall 1982), p. 11. 
30
 Yaakov Talmon, "Heshbon Nefesh" (Introspection), Haaretz, 30 November 1973 as quoted by Ephraim 
Kam in Surprise Attack, p. 130. 
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Thus, if warning intelligence is to be effective, the right question must be asked. In the 
case of the Yom Kippur War, the most relevant question was, "Are the Arabs going to 
attack," not "Can the Arabs win if they attack." 
c. Interdependency 
The third factor, interdependency, links the first two factors in a vicious circle. The 
preconceived conceptions of the situation will dictate what intelligence will be sought and 
the incoming data will be matched against the current paradigm. This circle discourages 
any analysis that does not support the accepted reality. British defense estimates following 
World War I exhibited the pitfalls of this factor. Estimates were developed under the 
assumption that war would not occur for ten years - the ten year rule. Any analytical 
conclusions to the contrary of this estimate would have to both correctly evaluate 
ambiguous incoming data and debunk the prevailing assumption. 
d. Devils Advocacy 
The most often recommended solution to the problem of preconceived perceptions 
is to require pluralism of opinion. During the 1970s, critics of intelligence estimates on the 
Vietnam War and Soviet nuclear strength were the strongest advocates of this solution. 
This solution has been termed devils-advocacy, alternative analysis, or iheA-team, B- 
team approach.31 Regardless of the term, analysts are tasked with developing alternative 
interpretations to a given set of data. Although this solution addresses the preconception 
31W. D. Howells, "Intelligence in Crisis," Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 27. No. 3, (Fall 1983), p. 14.; 
Ephraim Kam, Surprise Attack, p. 224-225. 
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pit-falls, as both Richard Betts and Ephraim Kam point out, an entirely new set of 
32 problems arise: 
- Multiple assessments increases the odds the correct assessment will be delayed. 
- The additional number of false alarms increases the likelihood of warnings being 
disregarded due to excessive "cries of wolf." 
- Presenting alternative opinions still does not provide clues as to which is correct. 
- At a time of decreasing resources, pluralism is not efficient. 
- An analyst designated as the "devils advocate" is likely to be disregarded because 
it is their job to disagree. Disagreement for the sake of disagreeing does not help. 
- Historical cases indicate that inadequacies in warning are rarely due to the 
absence of anyone ringing the alarm. Usually the alarm is disregarded. 
F. THE RECOGNITION PROBLEM 
This difficulty of accurate recognition constitutes one of the most serious 
sources of friction in war 33 
Carl Von Clausewitz 
The first three steps of the warning cycle ~ recognition, validation, and definition ~ 
can be consolidated into the single problem of accurately identifying the problem. This is 
identical to the problem outlined in the previous section ~ failure to correctly identify the 
problem. Combined, these three steps are the most critical and often most difficult link in 
the warning cycle - especially when attempting to forecast a RMA. 
32
 Richard K. Betts, "Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures are Inevitable," World 
Politics, Vol. 31, (October 1978), p. 76-78.; Ephraim Kam, Surprise Attack, p. 224-225. 
33
 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, p. 117. 
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1. Recognizing Anomalies 
A psychological experiment conducted by J. S. Bruner and Leo Postman in 1949 and 
described thirteen years later in Thomas Kuhn's book, The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions™ vividly demonstrates the difficulty and dangers of the recognition process. 
It also demonstrates that once an anomaly is recognized, the recognition of additional 
anomalies is significantly easier. 
Subjects were exposed to a series of playing cards for brief and controlled period of 
time. Many of the cards were normal but a few were made anomalous, e.g., a red six of 
spades and a black four of hearts. After each exposure the subject was asked what he had 
seen. Even for the periods of shortest exposure, many subjects identified most of the 
cards, and after a small increase all the subjects identified them all. For the normal cards 
these identifications were almost always correct, but the anomalous cards were almost 
always identified, without apparent hesitation or puzzlement, as normal. The black four of 
hearts might, for example be identified as the four of either spades or hearts. Without any 
awareness of trouble, it was immediately fitted to one of the conceptual categories prepared 
by prior existence. With a further increase of exposure to the anomalous cards, subjects 
did begin to hesitate and to display awareness of anomaly. Further increase of exposure 
resulted in still more hesitation and confusion until finally, and sometimes quite suddenly, 
The orginal study was performed by J. S. Bruner and Leo Postman and described in, "On the Perception 
of Incongruity: A Paradigm," ./oMrrca/ of Personality, XVIII (1949), p. 206-223. The study was used by 
Thomas S. Kuhn to illustrate the cognitive process of discovery in his book, The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions, (Chicago: Universtiy of Chicago Press, 1970), p. 62-64. 
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most subjects would produce the correct identification without hesitation. Moreover, after 
doing this with two or three of the anomalous cards, they would have little further difficulty 
with the others. 
Kuhn describes a number of other examples of recognition and discovery. In each case 
the pattern of recognition was the same: (1) awareness of the anomaly, (2) the gradual and 
simultaneous emergence of both observational and conceptual recognition, and (3) the 
change of paradigm categories and procedures.35 The key is the first step -- awareness of 
the anomaly. 
2. The Need for Indicators 
A solution to both the problem of recognizing anomalies and accounting for 
preconceived perceptions and objectivity lies in Thomas Kuhn's example involving the 
playing cards. These experiments strongly suggest that the problem in identifying a new 
paradigm is cognitive in nature. One must be open to the possibility that new data may 
exist and not fit the accepted model. This is extremely difficult since the vast majority of 
data does fit the model and no prior knowledge regarding the nature of the anomaly is 
known. However, if one starts from the premise that anomalies may occur, even if their 
nature is unknown, significant steps toward earlier detection can be made. If the subject, 
prior to viewing the cards, considered that there may be anomalies in the cards, a list of 
possible changes could be assembled at a leisurely pace and without having to concentrate 
on the immediate task of identifying the cards. One possible change would be switching 
' Ibid., p. 62-64. 
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the colors from black to red. Another would be substituting an eleven for the jack. There 
are certainly many other possibilities. More possible anomalies are likely to be considered 
than actually exist. When it comes time to view the cards, a quick comparison of the 
observed data to the list will increase the probability of detection. 
Specific indicators and indicator lists for specific problems are not new to the military. 
For example, indicators of a Russian invasion of Europe would likely include: 
- Dispersal and arming of aircraft 
- Increased reconnaissance of the battle area. 
- Cancellation of leave for soldiers. 
- Activation of additional command and control networks. 
- Movement of supplies such as fuel and ammunition to front line units. 
- Political rhetoric indicating displeasure with the current status. 
These indicators are specific actions, that can be observed, that the enemy must take to 
achieve a specific objective. During the initial stages of preparation for a surprise, only a 
few indicators are likely to be observed. However, as the time of action approaches, 
additional indicators will appear. As more and more of fliese indicators are observed, the 
less ambiguous future enemy actions become. A well conceived indicator list will articulate 
specific enemy actions that can be observed in time to provide sufficient warning. 
Therefore, in the case of a RMA, what is needed is a number of indicators that a new 
means of conducting warfare is being developed. As shown in the previous chapter, a 
revolution in military capability will involve changes in technology, organization, and 
doctrine. Indication of changes in one of these three areas will begin to expose new 
military capabilities. As the new paradigm begins to emerge, additional tasking of the 
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intelligence system can be initiated to ascertain the true nature of the developing 
capabilities. 
Any impressions that an indicator list is the perfect panacea are false. I & W 
intelligence and indicator lists does not give the analyst a perfect crystal ball. Not collecting 
relevant data can still occur. Different interpretations of data will continue. Policy-makers 
may still choose to ignore repeated warnings just as Stalin did prior to the Barbarossa 
invasion. Even the best I & W scheme can only tell you whether and to what extent a 
government is prepared or preparing to act. It cannot tell you why or what its intentions 
are, whether, for example, a government intends to attack or fears you may attack or is 
merely bluffing in tacit negotiation.36 In short, a list will never take the place of highly 
skilled, energetic, and insightful analysts. However, it does provide a superior tool to assist 
the analyst. 
;
 W. D. Howells, "Intelligence in Crisis," p. 10. 
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IV. RECOGNIZING TECHNICAL REVOLUTIONS 
A. THE MILITARY TECHNICAL REVOLUTION 
If the U.S. intelligence community is to detect and predict when another nation is about 
to achieve an RMA based on technology, it is necessary examine how technological 
innovation takes place. However, before examining the innovation process, the term 
"technical revolution" needs to defined and its effects examined. 
1. Definition 
To paraphrase the original definition of a revolution in military affairs, a military 
technical revolution (MTR) is "A fundamental advance in technology that renders existing 
methods of conducting warfare obsolete." As indicated in the previous chapter, the effects 
of a military technical revolution and technological surprise on the battlefield are virtually 
identical. Michael Handel's definition of technical surprise in his book War, Strategy and 
Intelligence offers some insight into a MTR or technological surprise: 
The unilateral advantage gained by the introduction of a new 
weapon (or the use of a known weapon in an innovative way) in war 
against an adversary who is either unaware of its existence or not ready 
with effective counter-measures, the development of which will take time. 
It must be noted that the term "weapon" includes any instrument that furthers the war 
effort and is not limited lethal devices or items present on the actual battlefield. Examples 
of non-lethal technologies that made a significant difference in the ability of armies to wage 
1
 Michael I. Handel, War, Strategy, and Intelligence, (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: Frank Cass and 
Company Ltd., 1989), p. 133. 
59 
war are the railroad, telegraph, and modern electronics. The Magic cipher used to decode 
Japanese secret codes during World War II was a technological surprise that did not appear 
on the field of combat but provided a decisive advantage throughout the war in the Pacific. 
The phrase the use of a known weapon in an innovative way indicates more of a 
change in doctrine rather than advancement in technology. Also considered more a matter 
of doctrine than technology is the use of unanticipated quantities of a certain weapons such 
as airplanes or tanks. However, if a technology was developed that enabled the 
construction of airplanes or tanks at a significantly increased pace, or increased their 
survivability in combat, it would be considered part of a technical revolution. Because 
quantitative changes are more of a doctrinal nature, they will be discussed in the next 
chapter. 
Handel's reference to counter-measures is an important acknowledgment that a MTR, 
or technological surprise, does not extend for an indefinite period of time. Just as effective 
counters to the hand-held crossbow were developed, and the telegraph was replaced by 
radios, a new technology will eventually be countered or negated. The key is that for an 
unknown and limited period of time, a decisive advantage will exist. 
2. Effects of an MTR 
A change in technology can have far reaching effects on warfare. This is true not just 
on the battlefield, but throughout all levels and phases of war. Van Creveld in his book, 
Technology and War, discusses the impact of technology: 
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Military technology affects warfare like waves spreading from a 
stone thrown in a pond. The disturbance is strongest at the point of 
impact; the farther the ripples spread, the weaker and less noticeable 
they become. And the farther they go, the more likely they are to lose 
their identity by becoming intermixed with ripples thrown by other stones 
or reflected back from the pond's banks. Similarly, weapons and weapon 
systems make their power felt principally during combat, but war consists 
of much else besides. Apart from tactics, there are operations, strategy, 
logistics, intelligence, "C3" (command, control, and communications), and 
organization to mention but a few. Naturally all of these are affected by 
weapons, but are also strongly influenced by other kinds of hardware, as 
well as technology in its abstract sense. Thus we must begin by taking into 
account mundane things such as roads, vehicles, communications, 
timekeepers, and maps, and end by considering the most complex problems 
of technological management, innovation, and conceptualization.2 
B. STIMULUS FOR INNOVATION 
The following quote from Sir Winston Churchill illustrates not only the problem of 
innovation but indirectly asks the question, "who stimulates innovation?" 
A hiatus exists between inventors who know what they could invent, 
if they only knew what was wanted, and the soldiers who know, or ought 
to know, what they want and would ask for it if they only knew how 
much science could do for them. 
1. Science-push 
Two models have been developed to address the question of who drives military 
innovation - the scientist or the soldier. The first model is that of 'Science-push.' This 
theory of innovation holds that pure curiosity-driven research by scientists looking only to 
2
 Martin Van Creveld, Technology and War, (New York: The Free Press, 1991), p. 2. 
3
 Sir Winston Churchill, The Great War, Vol 4 (London: The Home Library Edn, n.d.) Appendix 8, War 
Memorandum, 'Mechanical Power in the Offensive' (9 Novermber, 1916). 
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further human knowledge are the source of innovation. The case of the atomic bomb is an 
example of this model. During the 1920s and 1930s, scientist such as Einstein, Bohr, and 
Oppenheimer, conducted experiments to learn the nature of the atom. They were not in 
search of a bomb with destructive potential many times greater than previously imagined. 
Only after sufficient research did the possibility of an atomic bomb emerge. The feasibility 
of an atomic bomb was then communicated to the military, and eventually to President 
Roosevelt via a letter from Albert Einstein. This model is illustrated by the following 
outline:4 
Curiosity-oriented Applied Experimental Innovation 
research research        development 
2. Demand-pull 
The alternate view of innovation is that of "demand-pull." According to this model, 
innovations are called forth by the stated needs of the military. In a more economic sense, 
innovation is the results of demands by market forces. Without a demand for the product, 
its invention would go unrealized. An example would be the vacuum tube computer which 
was initially developed during the early 1950s to more efficiently solve ballistic 
computations for the U.S. military. If the demand were not present, the research would 
not have been funded and the computer not invented. The following outline illustrates this 
model:5 
Market demand Applied research Experimental development Innovation 
John Irvine and Ben R. Martin, Foresight in Science, (London: Frances Pinter Ltd  1984) p 15 
5
 Ibid., p. 16. 
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C. LESSONS FROM STUDIES OF INNOVATION 
1. Science and Demand are Factors 
In John Irvine and Ben Martin's book Foresight in Science, Picking the winners, this 
science-push/demand-pull question is addressed by examining a number of studies that 
took place during the 1960s and early 1970s.6   These studies were conducted with the goal 
of determining what government resources and actions would be most useful in promoting 
innovation. The lessons and conclusions of the various studies are equally useful from an 
intelligence standpoint, given that the goal is to determine what events or actions can be 
observed prior to the realization of technological innovations. 
The studies did not reach any definitive conclusions on the demand-pull or 
science-push question. Everett Rogers and Floyd Shoemaker in their 1971 analysis of 
innovation concluded, ". . . research does not provide a clear answer to this question of 
whether awareness of a need or awareness of an innovation (that creates a need) comes 
first."7 
However, a general trend in the relative strength of the models was noted. The 
predominance of critical discoveries, and the amount of effort leading up to an innovation, 
tends to shift from the realm of pure curiosity driven science to mission-oriented research 
6
 These studies include Battelle, Interactions of Science and Technology in the Invention Process: Some 
Case Studies, final report prepared for the National Science Foundation, Columbus, Ohio, Battelle 
Columbus Laboratories, 1973; IIT Research Institute, Technology in Retrospect and Critical Events in 
Science (TRACES), Washington, D. C, National Science Foundation, 1968; C. W. Sherwin and R. S. 
Isensen, First Interim Report on Project HINDSIGHT (Summary), Washington, D. C, Office of the 
Director of Defense Research Engineering, 1966. 
7
 Everett Rogers and Floyd Shoemaker, Communication of Innovation: A Cross-cultural Approach, (New 
York: The Free Press, 1971), p. 106. 
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and development as the innovation nears completion. The diagram on the following page 
depicting the research origins of the video tape-recorder illustrates this point. Although not 
an innovation with significant military applications, the depiction is representative of the 
history of military innovations. 
Note that nonmission-oriented research was more dominant during the period 25 - 50+ 
years before the actual innovation. However, beginning approximately 25 years before the 
video tape-recorder became a reality, mission-oriented research and developmental efforts 
started to become more prevalent. 
2. Curiosity-oriented Research is Unpredictable 
Breakthroughs resulting from curiosity-oriented research are difficult to predict and are 
more likely to occur a long time before the innovation or product emerges.8 Additionally, 
the inventor is likely to have little concept of the products that will result because of the 
breakthrough. 
3. Confluence of Distinct Lines of Research 
Figure 2 also illustrates a significant lesson of innovation process that is useful in 
directing efforts to detect the development of a new technologies. The synthesis or 
confluence of previously distinct lines of research makes innovation possible. This lesson 
is borne out not only by the video tape-recorder. Airplanes combined the technologies of 
internal combustion engines and aerodynamic theory. Radars combined 
IIT Research Institute, Technology in Retrospect and Critical Events in Science (TRACES), (Washington, 
D.C.: National Science Foundation, 1968) in John Irvine and Ben R. Martin, Foresight in Science: Picking 










Figure 2. The Research Origins of the Video Tape-Recorder! 
Ibid., p. 19. 
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electro-magnetic waves, magnetics, power sources, material science, and timing circuits. 
A re-examination of both the atomic bomb and vacuum tube computer reveal that these 
also show these same characteristics. Mission-oriented research was the primary stimulus 
for development of the atomic bomb in the few years prior to its completion. In the case 
of the vacuum tube computer, Thomas Edison's discovery of current flow inside a vacuum 
tube in 1883 was not part of an effort to develop a computer. The determination of 
science-push or demand-pull is primarily a factor of how far back the origin of a given 
innovation is traced. 
D. THE INNOVATION PROCESS 
In his book, The Wizard War, Professor R. V. Jones, the scientific advisor to Winston 
Churchill during World War n, outlines the steps that a new weapon proceeds through 
before it is adopted by the military services:10 
1. General scientific research of an academic or commercial nature occurs which 
causes 
2. Someone in close touch with a Fighting Service, and who is aware of Service 
requirements, to think of an application of the results of academic research. If 
this application be considered promising 
3. Ad hoc research and small-scale trials are performed in a Service laboratory. If 
these are successful 
4. Large-scale Service trials are undertaken; which may lead to 
5. Adoption in Service. 
These steps concur with numerous studies on innovation conducted during the 1960s and 
1970s.11 Michael Handel in his book War, Strategy, and Intelligence, adds a sixth stage 
to this process ~ use in battle.12   The entire process is depicted by the following diagram: 














and Inventions I 
Figure 3. The Military Technical Revolution Concept 
Applied to Unsolved Military Challenges13 
1. Discoveries and Inventions 
In the Discoveries and Inventions stage, intellectual breakthroughs are made in a 
fundamental area of science or physics. This stage is characterized by the following: 
- Work of men of genius 
- The discoveries were in the realm of pure science 
- The time of the breakthrough was unpredictable 
2. Emerging Technologies 
In the Emerging Technologies phase, the discoveries and new theories are translated 
into a device that appears to have some usefulness. This usefulness is not specific to 
military applications. Characteristics of this phase include:15 
11
 Gerald Zaltman, Robert Duncan, and Johnny Holbek, Innovations and Organizations, (New York: John 
Wiley & Sons, 1973), p. 61. 
12
 Michael I. Handel, War, Strategy, and Intelligence, p. 161. 
13
 Strategic Assessment Center of Science Applications International Corporation, The U.S. Navy 
Roundtable on the Revolution in Military Affairs, (Washington, D.C.: Science Applications International 
Corporation, July 1994), Tab "D". 
M
 Stefan T. Possony and J. E. Pournelle, The Strategy of Technology, (Cambridge, Mass.: University Press 
of Cambridge, Inc., 1970), p. 45. 
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- It is a creative art as much as a science 
- It both exploits and supports science 
- The invention is in the realm of technology, not pure science 
3. Technical Military Innovation 
In the Technical Military Innovation stage, the potential importance of the emerging 
technology is recognized and resources are allocated to translate the invention into a 
product that is materially useful. The importance of the technology is in relation to a 
specific problem.   Characteristics of this stage include:16 
- A decision is made based on recognition of the importance of a scientific 
principle or invention 
- The choice has major implications on future capabilities 
- The decision usually leads to a production decision 
4. Development of Operational Concepts 
In the Development of Operational Concepts stage, the chosen innovation is developed 
as a system. Concepts and doctrine are developed to maximize the usefulness of the new 
capability. New organizations may have to be formed to operate and maintain the 
innovation.   Characteristics of this stage include:17 
- Exploits the realm of engineering and technology, not science 
- It is a deliberate product of technology with a useful purpose in mind 
5. New Military Capability 
The New Military Capability stage completes the process. Appropriate numbers of the 
new technology are developed so that the innovation can be fully exploited. 
15
 Ibid., p. 46. 
16
 Ibid, p. 47. 
17
 Ibid., p. 48. 
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6. The Effect of Political and Economic Systems 
The steps outlined by Professor Jones do not depend on a particular style of 
government or economy. However, individual steps may benefit or be hindered by a 
particular social-economic system. As noted by Matthew Evangelista in Innovation and the 
Arms Race, "students of innovation have found that centralization tends to be negatively 
associated with innovativeness; that is the more power and control are concentrated in an 
organization, the less innovative the organization is."18 However, Evangelista later notes 
that "although a centralized system tends to inhibit innovation, it partly compensates for 
that problem by an ability to marshal resources behind new projects, once a decision is 
made."19 
E. FOCUSING INTELLIGENCE EFFORTS 
Lessons drawn from the previous examination of innovation strongly suggests that the 
best area to focus intelligence collection efforts to determine if a potentially hostile country 
is developing a MTR is Professor Jones' steps two and three. These steps correspond to 
Emerging Technologies and Technical Military Innovation of figure (2). Even discovery 
of hostile MTR capabilities as late as step three may not provide any workable options. 
The atomic bomb underwent only one "small scale" trial at Trinity, New Mexico a few 
weeks before being used at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 
18
 Matthew Evangelista, Innovation and the Arms Race, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 
1988), p. 29. 
19
 Ibid., p. 30. 
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Intelligence efforts focused on stage one, "Discoveries and Inventions," would waste 
limited resources by tracking unknown entities. At this stage the nature of the 
breakthrough or potential capabilities of the innovation is not likely to be known, even to 
the inventor. Additionally, the intellectual breakthrough may not prove relevant to any 
military problem. Thus concerted attempts to predict a breakthrough or specific military 
consequences at this point would waste limited resources and likely produce an 
unacceptable number of false alarms. 
If intelligence efforts are focused on step 4, when large-scale service trials begin and 
doctrinal and organizational concepts are developed, it is likely that the newly gathered 
information may be irrelevant because it is simply too late. Recall a RMA requires only 
that the enemy be unable to counter the new capability, not be unaware of it. 
F. INDICATORS OF A TECHNICAL REVOLUTION 
Given that the focus of intelligence efforts should be on emerging technologies and the 
initial stages of military innovations, indicators of MTR efforts in these areas must be 
developed. The indicator lists for each country will likely contain many of the same items. 
However, these list should not be identical. Different countries have different available 
resources, different areas of expertise, and exist in different strategic environments. Any 
occurrence of mirror imaging a country's technical interest and capabilities or dismissal of 
an interest as "unworthy of consideration" is done at great peril. This is a sure path to the 
problems of surprise and intelligence failures that were discussed in the previous chapters. 
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With those thoughts in mind, the following are steps to be taken that can serve as indicators 
of a developing MTR: 
1. Identification and Monitoring of Critical Technologies 
Beginning in 1989, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) was required to submit an 
annual Critical Technologies Plan to Congress.20 This plan attempts to identify the "critical 
technologies" that "are most essential to develop in order to ensure the long term qualitative 
superiority of United States weapon systems." Once a critical technology is identified, it 
must be monitored to detect significant breakthroughs. The implication of the new 
capabilities offered by the breakthrough must then be evaluated by both scientist and 
weapon experts. 
a. Criteria for critical technologies 
As previously stated, the Critical Technologies Plan was developed for the purpose 
of furthering U.S. technological developments, not for detecting potential developments by 
other countries. However, the rationale for selecting critical technologies can be applied to 
•        «21 
any country. Critical technologies were selected on one or more of the following criteria: 
20
 This requirement was first levied by Public Law 100-456, The National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 1989. The report was prepared by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) for the Committees 
on Armed Services of the United States Congress and initially issued 15 March 1989. A revision was issued 
on 5 May 1989. 
21
 These criteria were taken from U.S. Department of Defense, Critical Technologies Plan that was 
prepared to fulfill the requirements of Public Law 101-189 of November 29,1989. The report was prepared 
by the U.S. Department of Defense for the Committees on Armed Services of the United States Congress 




1. Technologies that enhance the performance of conventional weapon 
systems. 
2. Technologies that provide new military capabilities. 
Quality Design Criteria 
1. Technologies that improve weapon systems availability and 
dependability 
2. Technologies that improve weapon systems affordability 
Multiple Use Criteria 
1. Pervasiveness in major weapon systems 
2. Strengthening me industrial base 
b. U.S. critical technologies 
The following are 20 technologies identified as critical to the United States military 
by the Department of Defense:22 
- Semiconductor materials and microelectronics circuits 
- Software producibility 
- Parallel computer architectures 
- Machine intelligence and robotics 
- Simulation and modeling 
- Photonics 
- Sensitive radars 
- Passive sensors 
- Signal processing 
- Signature control 
- Weapon system environment 
- Data fusion 
- Computational fluid dynamics 
- Air-breathing propulsion 
- Pulsed power 
- Hypervelocity projectiles 
- High energy density materials 
- Composite materials 
- Superconductivity 
- Biotechnology materials and processes 
22 Ibid., p. 5. 
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2. Confluence of Distinct Lines of Research 
As the video tape-recorder example showed, when two or more distinct lines of 
research merge, revolutionary capabilities can result. Admiral Owen's vision of a future 
RMA based on dominant battlespace awareness would likely depend on the confluence of 
several of the above critical technologies. The merger of a highly efficient air-breathing 
propulsion system, machine intelligence and robotics, sensitive radars, passive sensors, 
signature control, and advanced signal processing capabilities would yield a stealthy 
reconnaissance platform with a long on-station time that could detect any enemy movement 
in a given area and relay that information instantaneously to a combat operations center. 
3. Merger of Existing Technologies 
A country may use a combination of several existing technologies to develop a new 
capability. This is much less expensive than the broad research and development efforts 
referenced in the previous indicator and does not depend on the fickle nature of 
technological breakthroughs. In addition, expertise is required in a relatively limited area. 
The U.S. Navy's development AGM-123 "Skipper" rocket-powered laser guided bomb 
provides a small scale example of how existing technologies being used by front-line units 
can be reconfigured to provide a weapon with significantly enhanced capabilities.      The 
skipper combined a free-fall "dumb" bomb, laser tracking technology, and a rocket motor. 
Again, all items were taken directly off the shelf.   Only the bomb and laser tracker were 
being used as a system. The addition of a rocket motor doubled the range of the weapon, 
23
 Janes Weapon's Systems: 1986-87, (London: Jane's Publishing Company, Ltd., 1987), p. 189. 
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allowed for its employment using tactics which greatly enhanced the launch aircraft's 
chances of survival, and maintained the inherent accuracy of a laser-guided "smart" bomb. 
Because the process used existing rounds, the cost of the "new" system was greatly 
reduced - showing that innovation does not need to be expensive. 
4. Simulation of Future Capabilities in War Games. 
In addition to enhancing proficiency with current weapons, war games offer the 
military an opportunity to identify the potential of new capabilities before the expense of 
time and money is made. In exercises conducted by the U.S. Navy during the 1920s, 
observation planes from the battleships and cruisers were used to simulate carrier aircraft. 
When the newly constructed aircraft carriers Lexington and Saratoga were commissioned 
in the late 1920s, many concepts for their use had already been developed.24 
Similar efforts are ongoing today. In 1992, following Desert Storm, the United States 
Army began experiments with a completely digitized battlefield. These efforts have been 
named by General Gordon Sullivan, Army Chief of Staff, the Louisiana Maneuvers after 
exercises conducted by General George Marshall in 1940-41. In a Keynote address to the 
Global Panel of Maastricht, the Netherlands, on 17 November 1994, General Sullivan 
detailed efforts to employ the capabilities of new information age technologies on the 
battlefield. 
Under the aegis of Louisiana Maneuvers, last spring we created a 
prototype digitized task force and exercised it at our National Training 
Center [Fort Irwin, California]. We put digital electronics on our tanks, 
howitzers, trucks ~ everything in and connected to about a 700-man force. 
24
 Norman Polmar, Aircraft Carriers: A Graphic History of Carrier Aviation and Its Influence on World 
Events, (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1969), p. 54. 
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And we connected them all together. 
We created a force empowered by information. We looked at it 
operating under difficult conditions, collected data, and we talked with 
each other about what we saw It was an enormous success because 
it enabled our people to see what truly could be. ... We have created 
other experiments and demonstrations to force people from traditionally 
isolated sectors to get together, find common ground and seek solutions 
to hard problems.25 
5. Identification of the Genius 
History has shown that dramatic increases in technology and military capabilities often 
hinge on the genius of a single person. To some extent this was true of Robert 
Oppenheimer and his direction of the Manhattan Project. This recognition of 
Oppenheimer is not meant to discount the vital contributions made by many other brilliant 
scientists and physicists in the effort to develop the atomic bomb. However, 
Oppenheimer's genius as both a scientist and an administrator was instrumental to the 
project's success. A more concrete example of how technology can depend on a single 
person is the attempt by Iraq to develop a "super gun" that could fire a projectile hundreds 
of miles. This effort was directed by Gerald Bull. Unfortunately for the Iraqis, Bull was 
assassinated before the gun could be completed.26 
25
 This 17 Nov. 1994 speech by General Sullivan is printed in Defense Issues, (Washington, D.C.: Armed 
Forces Information Service, Vol. 9, No. 91) 
26
 A complete account of Gerald Bull and his efforts to develop a supergun can be found in James Adams, 
Bull's Eye: The Assassination and Life of Supergun Inventor Gerald Bull, (New York: Times Books, 
1992) 
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6. Monitoring Research and Development Efforts 
This effort would identify and monitor several indicators of interest in new technologies 
and where that interest may lie. Such indicators would include:27 
- Long-term R&D funding and direction 
- Patent applications and grants 
- Successful innovations in the civilian sector 
- Quality and focus of the national education system 
- Number of scientists, engineers, and technology specialists 
- Technology information acquisition and exchange 
27
 James R. Fitzsimmonds, The Revolution in Military Affairs: Challenges for Defense Intelligence, 
(Washington, D. C: Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, 1992), p. 28. 
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V. RECOGNIZING DOCTRINAL REVOLUTIONS 
A. WHAT IS DOCTRINE 
Arguably the most important element in achieving a revolution in military affairs is the 
formation and optimization of doctrine. It is doctrine that dictates how the available and 
emerging technologies will be employed and it is doctrine that organizations will be 
optimized to support. Michael Mazarr recognizes this in his report on RMAs: 
A revolution in warfare will occur only when the potential of new 
technologies is harnessed under the guiding principles of a new war-fighting 
doctrine. The full potential of mechanization, air power, and radio 
communications, for example, was not realized until applied by the 
Germans in a doctrine of blitzkrieg warfare. The aircraft carrier did not 
realize its full potential until it was applied under a distinct naval doctrine 
that rendered the battleline obsolete.1 
1. Definition 
The number of definitions for the term "doctrine" is only exceeded by the number of 
interpretations of its meaning. It is often used as a synonym for terms such as: theory, 
idea, principle, belief, and concept. Therefore, to offer a single definitive definition is 
virtually impossible. However, by examining a few of the definitions and attributes of 
doctrine an appreciation for its meaning and importance can be reached. 
1
 Michael J. MazaiT, The Military Technical Revolution, (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, 1993), p. 33. 
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The term doctrine, by itself, refers to a theory based on carefully worked out 
principles and taught or advocated by its adherents?   It is not dogma, which is 
indisputable and not subject to debate. Therefore, military doctrine refers to a theory on 
how a military should act. These actions are based on carefully worked out principles and 
advocated by persons who have a professional interest in the military ~ primarily soldiers 
and statesmen. The following definitions are the official statements by the United States 
and the former Soviet Unions on what is military doctrine: 
Doctrine is the fundamental principles by which military forces 
guide their actions in support of national objectives; doctrine is authoritative 
but requires judgment in application. 
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1994 
Doctrine is ... an officially accepted system of views in a given state 
and in its Armed Forces on the nature of war and methods of conducting 
it and on preparation of the country and army for war.3 
Marshal A. A. Grechko, Minister of Defense, 1974 
. .. doctrine provides a military organization with a common philosophy, 
a common language, a common purpose, and a unity of effort. Doctrine 
influences, to a major degree, strategic thinking as well as the development of 
weapons, organization, training and tactics. Doctrine is the cement that 
binds a military organization into an effective fighting unit This doctrine 
includes not only the tactical employment of forces ... but also the 
fundamental principles or tenets of Army thinking. These concern such 
matters as the strategic conditions under which Army forces should be 
employed, the relation of these forces to those of other services, the 
operational environments of the field forces, and the basic principles 
David B. Guralnik, ed., WebstersNew World Dictionary, (New York: The World Publishing Company 
1970), p. 414. 
A. A. Grechko, Vooruzhennyye Sily Sovetskogo Gosudarstva [Armed Forces of the Soviet State], 1st ed 
(Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1974) p. 120 in Scott and Scott, Soviet Military Doctrine: Continuity, 
Formulation, and Dissemination, (Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 1988), 74. 
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which govern operations .... In this sense, we might consider doctrine 
as an Army creed which spells out the way we view our purpose in life and our 
relation to others.4 
General George H. Decker, U.S. Army Chief of Staff, 1962 
The first two definitions are, at the same time, similar and different. Each attempts to 
address doctrine's "what" questions -- what forces to use, what entities to attack, what is 
the nature of the war, what are the objectives. The significant difference is the level of 
command at which the doctrine must be followed. The United States explicitly grants 
authority to the military commander to disregard the accepted fundamental principles if and 
when the situation dictates. By not explicitly granting this authority to the military 
commander, the former Soviet Union reserved this right for the state. The extended 
definition offered by General Decker is useful because it outlines how pervasive doctrine is 
in everything that the military does — from planning to execution. 
2. Types of Military Doctrine 
Many qualifiers other than "military" are used preceding doctrine to indicate what 
specific principles are being addressed. "Nuclear doctrine" refers to fundamentals of 
acquiring and using nuclear weapons. Since the mid-1940s, expressions such as "Mutual 
Assured Destruction" (MAD) and "Flexible Response" have been used to describe 
different nuclear doctrines. To provide guidance when nuclear weapons are not likely to 
be used, several conventional doctrines exists such as the U.S. Air-Land-Sea joint forces 
doctrine or Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) doctrine. Within the military of a given country, 
4
 This quote was from an unspecified speech by General George H. Decker, former U.S. Army Chief of 
Staff. The text can be found as an untitled inset piece in Military Review, (July 1962), p. 7. 
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each of the individual services has a doctrine to outline principles that they expect to 
operate under, i.e. army, naval, or air force doctrine.   Entities within the individual services 
also have their own doctrine, both written and unwritten. For example, the U.S. Navy has 
separate principles for the employment of submarines, amphibious forces, and aircraft 
carrier battle groups. 
B. ATTRIBUTES OF EFFECTIVE DOCTRINE 
The existence of a written doctrine is no more the "proof that it is acceptable than the 
existence of an arms control treaty is "proof of the effective arms control. For this reason, 
attributes, or measures of effectiveness (MOEs), are needed to verify the that the accepted 
doctrine can be implemented and that it supports the nation's strategic objectives. The 
following are several attributes of effective doctrine:5 
1. Success in Combat 
Success in combat is the only true measure of effective doctrine. Anything less should 
not be acceptable. This may seem to be an overly obvious, but doctrines are subject to 
many factors other than viability in combat. For example, two reasons for building the 
next generation of nuclear attack submarines is to maintain the industrial expertise and 
promote competition between shipyards. Neither is a direct consideration of the strategic 
The following five attributes of effective doctrine were taken from Dr. James J. Tritten, Lessons and 
Conclusions From the History of Naval and Military Doctrine Development, (Norfolk, Virginia: Naval 
Doctrine Command, 1995), p. 18-19. 
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environment or the needs of the U.S. Navy, but those reasons were used to justify the 
submarine's construction. 
2. Acceptability by the Military and Nation 
Any doctrine is worthless unless it is acceptable by both the people directing the action 
and those performing the required tasks. To paraphrase Wayne Hughes from Fleet 
Tactics, "Doctrine isn't what is written in books; it is what statesmen and warriors believe 
in and act on.6  If either side does not support a given doctrine and performs acts 
inconsistent with the tenets of the doctrine, disunity of action will result and the entire 
endeavor is likely to fail and unwanted consequences will occur. The interaction between 
Secretary of Defense McNamara and Admiral Anderson, Chief of Naval Operations 
(CNO), during the Cuban Missile Crisis illustrates this point: 
Soviet ships that had been approaching the U.S. naval blockade of 
Cuba had stopped dead in the water, apparently not wishing to challenge 
the exclusion zone. The Navy however was fearful that the ships were 
rendezvousing with submarines. McNamara, sensing President Kennedy's 
fears that an unwanted incident could reverse the Soviet's "blink," began 
to harshly question the CNO on blockade procedures. Picking up the 
Manual of Navy Regulations, Anderson waved it in McNamara's face 
and shouted, "It's all in there." To which McNamara replied, "I don't give 
a damn what John Paul Jones would have done; I want to know what you 
are going to do now." 
6
 Wayne P. Hughes, Fleet Tactics, (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1986), p. 28. 
7
 Graham T. Allison, "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," The American Political Science 
Review, No. 3, (1969), p. 539-540. 
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3. Adaptability and Flexibility 
Doctrine must be both adaptable and flexible in the face of external threats and internal 
change. Additionally, an excessively rigid doctrine allows a potential foe to predict with 
absolute certainty what actions you will take when presented with a given set of conditions. 
Counters to those actions can be pre-planned in order to inflict maximum harm. Quotes by 
Lord John A. Fisher, the First Sea Lord of the British Admiralty at the beginning of World 
War I and Winston Churchill, reveal insight on how dangerous an excessively rigid 
doctrine, or blind obedience to a particular doctrine, can be: 
Jellicoe, [commander in chief of the British Grand Fleet] had all 
the Nelsonic attributes except one ~ he is totally wanting in the great 
gift of Insubordination For all Jellicoe's methodical planning, he 
could never dispel Churchill's fearful admonition: He was "the one man 
who could have lost the war in an afternoon.8 
As it turned out, when battle came for Jellicoe at Jutland he would act correctly, but strictly 
according to the rules, and an opportunity to deliver a decisive blow to the German Fleet 
was lost.9  Despite allowing the German Fleet to escape, fears that Jellicoe would lose the 
fleet and the war were not realized. 
4. Relevancy 
Effective doctrine must be relevant and strongly address the most likely scenarios. 
Because doctrine affects how an individual nation fights, trains, exercises, organizes, what 
Robert L. O'Connell, Sacred Vessels, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 159. 
Ibid., p. 159. 
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10 it buys, and how plans are made, it must be geared toward meaningful problems.    Nations 
may be excused if they are not prepared for the most unlikely of attacks, but it is 
unforgivable not to address the most likely threats. 
5. Attainability 
Doctrine must be attainable in the face of constraints. Those constraints could be 
material, such as petroleum or fissile material; personnel, such as numbers of potential 
soldiers; or political, such as the will of the people in a democratic nation. The ability to 
drill and train is also needed. This ensures that the desired doctrine can be executed when 
needed. Without the resources and training, doctrine is unfulfilled wishes of how one 
would like to operate.11 
C. WHY DOES DOCTRINE CHANGE? 
A variety of factors can cause military doctrines to change. These factors may act 
singularly or in combination with each other.   When more than one factor is present, they 
may or may not support each other in providing the impetus to change doctrine or the 
direction in which change should occur. These changes may or may not support a future 
RMA. 
10
 Dr. James J. Tritten, Lessons and Conclusions From the History of Navy and Military Doctrinal 
Development, p. 30. 
11
 Ibid., p. 19. 
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1. Strategie Objectives 
Arguably the most powerful factor that causes military doctrine to change is a change 
in the strategic objectives of the nation. This logically follows from the initial definition of 
doctrine ~ a guide for military actions in support of national objectives. Objectives must 
be viewed from a macroscopic level. Doctrine need not change if the strategic objective is 
changed from conquering country "A" to country "B." In both cases, the aggressor has 
offensive and expansionist strategic goals. However, if the previous aggressor decides to 
establish peaceful diplomatic and economic relations with countries "A" and "B", or these 
two potential victims have significantly different military capabilities, the aggressor is likely 
to employ different doctrines. 
2.   Strategic Environment 
Concurrent with changes in strategic objectives are changes in the strategic 
environment. As noted in the U.S. Army's doctrine, Force XXI Operations, "Military 
doctrine must be capable of executing the strategy of its time." The strategic environment 
takes into account both the total available resources - economic, social political, and 
military - that a given country possesses and that are arrayed against it.12  Naval 
developments during the interior period illustrate effects of different strategic 
environments. The United States and Japan envisioned a naval war fought in the central 
Pacific where land-based air would be scarce and bases vulnerable. Japan also considered 
carriers a complement to the battleships denied it by treaty. Britain, the third of the great 
12
 Trevor N. Dupuy, Curt Johnson, and Grace P. Hayes, Dictionary of Military Terms, (New York: The H 
W. Wilson Company, 1986), p. 208-209. 
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carrier-aviation pioneers, did not have the same compelling rationale from investment in 
carriers for many reasons: (1) the lack of an enemy carrier-based naval air threat in 
Europe; (2) the presumed availability of land-based air for maritime missions; and (3) the 
requirement for large surface forces to control the approaches to the British isles and the 
exits from the Baltic, the English Channel, and the Mediterranean.13 
3. Changes in Leadership 
Changes in leadership can mean a radical change in national objectives and thus a 
change in military doctrine. However, leadership changes are unlikely to lead to 
revolutionary military capabilities in the near term. This is particularly true for dictatorships 
where changes in leadership often involve violence and come from the opposite side of the 
political spectrum. More often than not, drastic changes in government will lead to a 
marked decrease in military capabilities because the senior officers are either not trusted, 
retired, or killed, and new officers lack experience. New operational methods require 
practice, even if existing and familiar equipment is used. Doctrine is something that must 
be understood and acted on by everyone. 
4. Defeat/Success on the Battlefield 
Until decisively demonstrated on the battlefield, old doctrine is difficult to reject and 
new doctrine is unlikely to receive widespread acceptance. Graham Allison, in Essence of 
Decision notes the pressure on an organization to innovate following defeat: "Events 
understood to be serious failures challenge the organization's basic existence. It [the 
13
 Alland R. Millett and Willianmson Murray, Innovation in the Intenvar Period, (Washington, B.C.: 
Office of Net Assessement, 1994), p. 567-568. 
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organization] owes its existence to achievement of a certain purpose. The organization 
must innovate in a way that achieves the purpose, or it will suffer. "14   Two types of 
success can drive innovation. First, successful use of a new doctrine by a third parry can 
be the rationale to copy success. Military organizations are infamous for aping the doctrine 
of the last war. Second, unanticipated successes with a developing doctrine can drive 
changes to further exploit the newly realized opportunities. Lessons learned during the 
Spanish Civil War and the invasion of Poland were instrumental in the development of the 
doctrine used by Germany for the invasion of France. 
5. Change in Technology 
hi his treatise titled, "The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1883," Alfred 
Thayer Mahan observed that changes in doctrine are the result of changes in technology. 
He also laments the time needed for doctrine to catch-up with technology: 
The unresting progress of mankind causes continual change in 
weapons; and with that must come a continual change in the manner of 
fighting The seaman who carefully studies the causes of success or 
failure ... will observe that changes in tactics have not only taken place 
after changes in weapons, which is necessarily the case, but that the 
interval between such changes has been unduly long. 15 
Mahan incorrectly asserts that technology must precede doctrine. In the mid-1980s when 
the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) was still active, doctrine for its deployment was being 
4
 Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston- Little Brown, 
1971), p. 85. 
15
 Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1883,21st ed. (Boston: Little, 
Brown & Company, 1917). 
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developed before the goals became feasible.   When the program efforts were significantly 
reduced, the technology for deployment was still lacking. 
6. Change in Available Resources 
A change in doctrine due to changes in available resources can be the result of foreign 
or domestic actions. The American embargo on sales of scrap iron and war material to 
Japan in December of 1940 provided incentives for the Japanese to develop a military 
doctrine that would ensure the ability to acquire these resources. 
Beginning in the late 1980s, cuts in the U.S. defense budget forced the individual 
services to seek new and cheaper ways of training. One solution was the adoption of 
sophisticated simulation systems into the training doctrine. For example, simulation was 
used in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) exercise Atlantic Resolve 94.16 
During Atlantic Resolve 94, the Synthetic Theater of War-Europe (STOW-E) exercise 
integrated high-fidelity simulators at three different sites into live air, land and sea exercises. 
The potential effects that simulated exercises can have on doctrine is evidenced by the U.S. 
Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral J. M. Boorda's, statement, "Using combat scenarios, 
not only can we experiment and test new warfighting concepts, but also address anticipated 
needs and potential technologies to meet them." 
New, and more effective doctrine was certainly not a goal in either case when resources 
were cut. However, as the relatively austere defense budgets of the interwar period 
demonstrated, and is emerging in the post Cold War era, new solutions are often found 
16
 This exercise is described in J. R. Wilson's article "Simulation Bites the Budget Bullet," in International 
Defense Review, No. 28, (April 1995), p. 44-48. 
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during difficult times. As a result, readiness and capabilities can emerge in better condition 
than before the cuts. 
7. Enlightened Vision 
Often the enlightened vision and persistence of one or two people can push doctrine in 
a new and revolutionary direction. This was the case for the development of Blitzkrieg 
doctrine. General Heinz Guderian championed the German development of fast moving 
armored warfare during the 1920s and 1930s. His concepts were based on the conceptual 
writings of the first British armored theorists, Captain B. H. Liddell-Hart and General J. F. 
C. Fuller. He also studied their reports of the early British experiments.17 
In the late 1700s and earry 1800s, Napoleon's vision and energetic direction enabled the 
development of corps doctrine, organization, and tactics. It is highly probable that only 
Napoleon could have made such a system work and, as evidenced by failure in Spain, the 
result of his absence was defeat.18 
D. INDICATORS OF DOCTRINAL CHANGE 
The factors that cause doctrine to change logically lead to indicators of new doctrine. 
As was the case with changes in technology, all doctrinal changes do not lead to 
revolutionary military capabilities. However, all revolutions in military affairs must 
17
 Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press 19841 
p. 208-209. 
18
 Martin Van Creveld, Command in War, (Cambridge, Massaschusetts: Havard University Press, 1985), 
p. 62. 
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incorporate new doctrine. Only through concerted analysis by subject matter experts can 
the wheat be separated from the chaff. 
1. Use Against a Third Party 
Because effective doctrine requires cohesion of action, and since change always has 
many detractors, new principles of warfighting are likely to be tried out on a relatively small 
scale before being fully adopted. Observation of these "minor" engagements as a 
non-combatant offers the opportunity to determine if new doctrinal concepts are being 
utilized. Particular attention must be paid to engagements that result in unexpected 
successes, even if that success is in a narrow or limited area. The lessons learned will be 
used to further improve doctrine and justify employment on a grander scale. This was the 
case in the Crimean War, the Franco-Prussian War, and the Russo-Japanese War.19 
2. War Games and Exercises 
Similar to the lessons available in observing third parties, war games and exercises offer 
the opportunities to both validate established doctrine and explore the possibilities offered 
by new doctrines. Clausewitz, on the usefulness of war games wrote: 
... it can give the mind insight into the great mass of phenomena 
and their relationships, then leave it free to rise into the higher realms of 
actions. There the mind can use its innate talents to capacity, combining 
them all so as to seize on what is RIGHT and TRUE as though this were 
a single idea ... a response to the immediate challenge rather than the 
product of thought.20 
19
 Steven Metz and James Kievit, Strategy and the Revolution in Military Affairs: From Theory to Policy, 
(Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 1995), p. 16. 
20
 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 578. 
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No better example of the usefulness of war games in the development of doctrine exists 
than the U.S. Navy's effort to plan for war in the Pacific.21 The war games begun in 1911 
in anticipation of war with ORANGE (Japan) would foreshadow all U.S. actions during 
the Pacific portion of World War II. By the early 1920s the games conducted at the Naval 
War College in Newport, Rhode Island revealed that if the Philippines fell, a single decisive 
attempt to immediately re-take the islands would likely result in the destruction of the U.S. 
Fleet. From that point, requirements and doctrine for a protracted island hopping 
campaign involving yet to be developed capabilities of amphibious landings, underway 
replenishment, blockade of the Japanese Islands, and aircraft carrier operations all took 
shape on the game board. Concepts conceived and practiced on the game board were then 
tested during the annual Fleet Exercises conducted by real ships and airplanes. By 1941 
every senior U.S. Naval officer had a similar view of how the war would unfold and what 
was needed to win - after all, they had spent their entire professional lives practicing and 
preparing for it.22 
3. New Manuals and Doctrinal Publications 
Doctrine is only effective if all members of the organization are aware of the desired 
principles and act accordingly. If doctrine changes, new policies must be promulgated so 
all members have a clear understanding of their responsibilities. If the new doctrine is not 
21A complete description of the war games can be found in Michael Vlahos, The Blue Sword: The Naval 
War College and the American Mission, 1919-1941, (Newport, Rhode Island: Naval War College Press, 
1980). A description of the Fleet Exercises of the 1920s and 1930s can be found in Norman Polmar, 
Aircraft Carriers, (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1969). 
22
 Michael Vlahos, The Blue Sword: The Naval War College and the American Mission 1919-1941 
p. 121. 
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widely distributed and understood, any new endeavors will lack unity of direction. 
Additionally, the amount of analysis and criticism available for the purpose of improving 
the doctrine will be limited. In the early 1960s, when the former Soviet Union wanted to 
inform both the military and civilian populous of the new doctrine based on the superiority 
of nuclear weapons, the book Nuclear Strategy was published. Written by Marshal 
Sokolovskiy, former chief of the General Staff, this book described how military forces, 
the economy, and the entire Soviet population must be prepared for the "eventuality" of 
nuclear war.23 In the United States, following the Goldwater-Nichols Department of 
Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, 100 subject areas were selected for joint doctrine 
development. By 1994, new doctrine had been formulated and disseminated via joint 
publications in over half of the selected subject areas.24 To help achieve the goals of joint 
operations, these publications are unclassified and widely available to military and civilians 
alike. Acquisition and analysis of these types of manuals provide an opportunity to 
ascertain how a potential enemy will fight. 
4. New Orientation of Curriculum in Service Schools 
This indicator is closely linked to that of New manuals and doctrinal publications. 
Both have the goal of promulgating new methods of conducting business, new goals, and 
the intricacies of new technologies. This change in orientation can take place within the 
existing infrastructure or may require the establishment of new organizations. For 
23
 Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott, The Soviet Art of War, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 
1982), p. 158. 
2A
 Paul Bracken and Raoul 
War College, 1994), p. 26. 
24
 Paul racken and aoul Henri Alcal'a, Whither theRMA, (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army 
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example, after the fall of the former Soviet Union, the orientation of U.S. intelligence 
training schools had to shift part of their focus to reflect the new strategic environment. 
An evaluation of the new curriculum and areas of interest would reflect where the military 
and civilian leaders perceived the next greatest threats and most likely areas of military 
engagement. Such areas include low intensity conflicts and operations other than war 
(humanitarian operations). The mission of intelligence is to provide the type of information 
the war fighter needs to be successful. New organizations were not needed, existing ones 
had to be re-oriented. 
5. Professional Journals 
Although articles rarely have the impact George Kennan's 1947 "X" essay in Foreign 
Affairs, titled "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," had in framing the doctrine of 
containment at the start of the Cold War, many new concepts are proposed in professional 
publications.    Professional journals offer the opportunity to propose changes in doctrine, 
put forth new ideas, stir debate, and elicit feedback without having to take official 
responsibility. As previously indicated in chapter 2, Marshall Ogarkov's concepts of a 
future revolution in military affairs were initially published in Soviet professional military 
journals such as Red Star and Kommunist. During the mid-1990s, concepts for 
revolutionary Intelligence - Strike - Reconnaissance architectures and Information War 
have appeared in U.S. professional military publications such as, Military Review, Naval 
25
 Gregg Herken, Counsels of War, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 47. 
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Institute Proceedings, and Joint Forces Quarterly?6 Most of the proposals will not lead to 
new doctrine, but a few will. At the very least, the flavor of debate and direction of change 
can be discerned. 
26
 A few of the articles include Admiral William A. Owens, "The Emerging System of Systems," 
Proceedings Vol. 121, No. 5, issue 1,107 (May 1995), p. 35-39; Edward C. Ferriter, "Which Way Joint 
Doctrine?" Joint Forces Quarterly, No. 8, (Summer 1995), p. 118-119; George F. Kraus Jr., "Information 
Warfare in 2015," Proceedings, Vol. 121, No. 8, issue 1,110 (August 1995), p. 42-45; James R. Fitzsimonds 




VI. RECOGNIZING ORGANIZATIONAL REVOLUTIONS 
There is nothing more difficult to carry out or more doubtful of 
success, nor dangerous to handle, than to initiate a new order for things. 
For the reformer has   enemies and ... only lukewarm supporters. 
Niccolo' Machiavelli 
Organizational revolutions have just as much, if not more, capability to change the 
nature of warfare than technical or doctrinal revolutions.1 This truth was most visible 
following the French Revolution as national armies began to emerge. The successes of 
Napoleon served to reinforce the importance of organizations. Prior to the French 
Revolution, armies were made up of undisciplined mercenaries drawn from the dregs of 
society who would desert unless watched nearby every moment. This need for close 
control of the soldiers severely limited the size, tactics, and coordinated maneuvers that 
armies could employ. Following the French Revolution, former subjects of kings became 
citizens and formed attachments of love and loyalty to their nations. A sense of group 
identity and loyalty developed.2 No longer was close control necessary. Napoleon was 
able to take advantage of this new loyalty and sense of purpose to organize an army that 
was far superior to any other on the continent. 
1
 Geoffrey Best ed., The Permanent Revolution, (Chicago: University Press, 1988), p. 50. 
2
 Alexander, How Great Generals Win, (New York: Norton Press, 1993), p. 96. 
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A. ORGANIZATIONAL MODELS 
Because the structure of every government and organizational element are different, 
conceptual models are useful to help explain their behavior. The models of a "rational 
actor," "organizational actor," and "bureaucratic actor" developed by Graham Allison in his 
examination of the Cuban Missile Crisis3 are particularly useful. Each one of these models 
has a different disposition toward innovation. An examination of each will show how 
innovation can be assisted and how it is hindered. 
1. The Rational Policy Model 
The Rational Policy model has policy as a national choice as the basic unit of analysis. 
The nation or government is conceived as a rational, unitary decision-maker. National 
security and national interests are the principle categories in which strategic goals are 
conceived. Various courses of action relevant to a strategic problem provide the spectrum 
of options. Enactment of each alternative course of action will produce a series of 
consequences. The relevant consequences constitute benefits and costs in terms of the 
strategic goals and objectives. Choices are made to maximize the outcome. Therefore, the 
rational agent will choose the alternative whose results rank highest in terms of goals and 
objectives. 
This model exhibits the characteristics that are most likely to support innovation and a 
revolution in military affairs, given that the goal is a more efficient and capable military. 
3
 Graham T. Allison, "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," The American Political Science 
Review, No. 3, (1969), p. 689-718. 
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This is the best model because, given that the problem and possible courses of action can 
be accurately defined, the correct solution will emerge. However, some critical capabilities 
are implied that are difficult to implement. These difficulties are present in all of the 
models. First, the strategic problem must be definable. This was relatively easy during the 
Cold War but is much more difficult now. Until the nature of the problem is grasped, 
direct steps to counter it can not be taken. Additionally, as long as uncertainty exists in 
defining the problem, choices that keep a wide range of options open are likely to be 
selected. Second, it is unlikely that all of the consequences, costs, and benefits that a 
particular course of action entails will be realized when the choice is made. Therefore, a 
course of action must be constantly adjusted to compensate for these unanticipated results. 
Finally, the choice that maximizes the outcome in one area, such as defense, may overly 
burden other areas, such as domestic programs. 
2. The Organizational Process Model 
The Organizational Process model has policy as an organizational output as the basic 
unit of analysis. The organizational actor is not a monolithic "nation" or "government" but 
rather a constellation of loosely allied organizations on top of which government leaders sit. 
This constellation acts only as component organizations perform routines. Each 
organization perceives problems, processes information, and performs a range of actions in 
quasi-independence (within the broad guidelines of national policy). In producing outputs, 
the activity of each organization is characterized by: Constraints defining acceptable 
performance, sequential attention to goals, Standard operating procedures, Programs and 
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repertoires, Uncertainty avoidance, Organizational learning and change, and central 
coordination and control. 
Innovation will be significantly hindered by this model. The goals of avoiding 
uncertainty and the strong desire to apply standard procedures to all problems will reject 
new ways of approaching and solving a problem. Solutions to problems that are not within 
the bounds of acceptable solutions are likely to be rejected out right. Therefore, it is 
virtually impossible for a RMA to emerge from this model since, by definition, a revolution 
in military affairs requires a solution that is completely different from the standard. 
3. The Bureaucratic Politics Model 
The Bureaucratic Politics model has policy as a political outcome as the basic unit of 
analysis. The actor is neither unitary or a conglomerate of organizations, but rather a 
number of individual players. Groups of these players constitute the agent for particular 
government decisions and actions. The position within the government defines what each 
player must, and is able, to do. Therefore, it is not the individual that matters but rather the 
position in government that he occupies. The advantages and handicaps which each player 
enjoys stem from his position in the government. Outcomes emerge from a struggle 
between the players to reach a consensus response to the situation. Although this response 
may be acceptable to the players, it may constitute an irrational solution to the problem. 
For a revolution in military affairs to emerge from this model, the structure of the 
organization must be such that innovative solutions are both accepted and encouraged from 
all, or at least most, players. In this way, the outcome or the struggle between the players 
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will be such that innovation will always be favored. The danger in this model is that as a 
result of the struggle, the direction chosen in which to innovate may be off target and not 
adequately address the strategic situation. 
B. WHY ORGANIZATIONS CHANGE 
The vast majority of information available on organizational change is written from the 
perspective of a business person or bureaucrat trying to change an organization, not what 
causes organizations to change. Thus, answers are sought to questions such as: how to 
stimulate change; when should organizations change; what are the barriers that impede 
change; how to develop a climate to promote change; and what is the best way to change. 
However, to better understand organizational revolutions, it is necessary to determine why 
an organization would need, or want, to change in the first place.4 
1. History 
As noted by Andrew Krepinevich, "With rare exceptions, great-power challengers, or a 
coalition of challengers, historically have arisen relatively quickly to offset a dominant 
military power. What the United States does, or fails to do, in moving to realize the 
potentially dramatic improvements in military effectiveness will influence whether potential 
competitors are deterred from entering the competition as well as how they pursue the 
4
 Works that attempt to answer this question include Amir Levy and Uri Merry, Organizational 
Transformation: Approaches, Strategies, Theories (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1986), p. 269-272 and 
Paul R. Lawrence "Why Organizations Change" in Allan M. Mohraman and others, Large-Scale 
Organizational Change, (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Inc., 1989), p. 48-61. 
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competition."5 Additionally, if history indicates that a challenger will arise, it is imperative 
that preparations to meet that challenge begin as soon as possible. Failure to do so 
increases the chances of being unprepared to meet that future challenge ~ whatever form it 
may take. 
2. Possibilities of a New Battlefield 
If, as the Tofflers contend, the way we make wealth is the way we make war,6 it is 
possible that a new means of warfare based on the flow and management of information 
will emerge. The factors of industrial production such as tanks, ships, and airplanes could 
become less and less a source of power. Additionally, the leader in the flow and 
management of information is the private sector, not controlled military organizations with 
limited access.   Everyone has access to the new technology, unlike the nuclear revolution 
which required a large, and highly complex, set of industrial facilities along with technical 
expertise The technologies required for a technical revolution in information war are more 
widespread, easy to obtain, and are available at dramatically lower cost than previous 
sources of military power. 
3. Change in the Environment 
Changes in the environment can create either a calamity or an opportunity. Both can 
be the trigger that sets off organizational change. Examples of events that can change 
5
 Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr., "Keeping Pace with the Mihtaiy-Technical Revolution," Issues in Science and 
Technology, Vol. X, No. 4, (Summer 1994), p. 26. 
6
 Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War, (New York: Warner Books, Inc., 1993), p. 64-68. 
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organizations due to misfortune include a reduction in funds available to accomplish a 
given mission and an unexpected innovation or action by a competitor.   Events that create 
opportunities include unexpected successes in a previously neglected area, and an increase 
in the availability of funds. 
4. Technology 
Changes in technology often present opportunities that require a change in existing 
organizations, or formation of new organizations, in order to fully exploit the new 
possibilities. Recall from chapter two, the development of the German General Staff 
during the mid-1800s was in large part done to exploit the new railways. A new 
organization was required to achieve maximum efficiency in coordinating the movement of 
soldiers, weapons, supplies, and trains.   The ability to get more soldiers to the front also 
required changes in both organization and doctrine. Helmut Von Moltke, Prussia's chief 
of staff, reasoned that the concentration of such forces was "in itself a calamity," for the 
growth of major formations ~ the corps, which now numbered in excess of 30,000 men 
each — had made it impossible to maintain any one of them along any given axis of 
advance.7 
5. Political Mandates 
New laws or orders from a country's leadership can force changes in organizations. In 
the United States, the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization act of 19868 is an 
7
 Martin Van Creveld, Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton, (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1977), p. 81. 
8
 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (10 USC 161 et. seq. PL 99-433). 
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excellent example. A goal of this act was to save money and increase the efficiency of the 
U.S. military by forcing the individual services of the U.S. military to become more 
interoperable. Although the changes may have occurred without the act, its presence 
forced the issue. 
C. HOW ORGANIZATIONS CHANGE 
Just as simplification was needed to discuss organizational models, simplification is also 
required to discuss how organizations change. Two different models prove useful in 
analyzing change. The first model is concerned with the dynamics of the process of 
change. It involves a six stages and was developed by Larry Greiner. The second model, 
developed by Harold Leavitt, is concerned with what elements an organization can alter to 
cause change. 
1. Dynamics of Change 
Larry Greiner and several associates studied eighteen different organizations in an 
attempt to determine the dynamics of organizational change.9 The examined organizations 
included civilian industrial, technical, and non-technical organizations along with an 
unnamed United States Navy battleship. Particular interest centered on (1) the conditions 
leading up to an attempted change, (2) the manner in which the change was introduced, (3) 
the critical blocks and/or facilitators encountered during the implementation, and (4) the 
9
 Lany E. Greiner, "Patterns of Organizational Change," in Gene W. Dalton, Paul R. Lawrence, and Larry 
E. Greiner, Organizational Change and Development, (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc. and 
The Dorsey Press, 1970), p. 213-229. 
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more lasting results which appeared over a period of time. Figure 4 illustrates the pattern 
he discerned from organizations which were able to successfully change. 
Figure 4. Patterns of Organizational Change 
Phase 1: The organization, and especially top management is under considerable external 
and internal pressure for improvement long before an explicit organization change is 
contemplated. Performance and/or moral is relatively low. Top management seems to be 
groping for a solution to its problems. 
Phase 2: A new person, known for their ability to introduce improvements, enters the 
organization, either as the official head or the organization, or as a consultant who deals 
directly with the head of the organization. An initial act of the new person is to encourage 
a reexamination of past practices and current problems within the organization. 
Phase 3: The head of the organization and their immediate subordinates assume a direct 
and highly involved role in the reexamination. The new person, with top management 
support, engages several levels of the organization in the collaborative, fact-finding, 
problem-solving discussions to identify and diagnose current organization problems. 
Phase 4: The new person provides others with new ideas and methods for developing 
solutions to problems, again at many levels of the organization. 
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Phase 5: The solutions and decisions are developed, tested, and found creditable for 
solving problems on a small scale before an attempt is made to widen the scope of change 
to larger problems and the entire organization. 
Phase 6: The change effort spreads with each success experience, and as management 
support grows, it is gradually absorbed permanently into the organization's way of life. 
2. Structure of Change 
Harold Leavitt developed a model that is useful in examining the variables that interact 
in an interdependent system to produce change.10 From his model, various approaches can 
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Figure 5. Approaches to Organizational Change 
10
 Harold J. Leavitt, "Applied Organization Change in Industry: Structural, Technical and Human 
Approaches," in W. W. Cooper, H. J. Leavitt, and M. W. Shelly, New Perspectives in Organization 
Research, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1964), p. 55-71. 
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Leavitt's four interacting variables of change are task, technology, people, and structure. 
The task variable is seen as the primary output or dependent variable, while people, 
technology, and structure are independent variables that can be used in strategies for 
organizational change. The term task refers to the organization's raisons d'etre or reasons 
for being. In the case of the military the task is to provide for the nation's defense. The 
other variables are self explanatory. 
The examination of how technology changes was thoroughly explored in chapter four 
and will not be discussed any further in this chapter. The remaining two independent 
variables structure and people, lead to the other two possible approaches to affect change. 
a. Structural Approach 
The structural approach believes that one does not change attitudes and behaviors 
by teaching new skills, but rather by changing the interactional structure of the 
organization. Once the structure is changed, attitudes and performance will follow. 
Although many case studies of organizational change support this approach, at least one 
significant problem exists: The individuals within the structure are considered constant and 
interchangeable. Thus their actions will reflect their position in the structure. This 
coincides with Allison's Bureaucratic politics model previously discussed. 
b. People Approach 
The people approach attempts to effect organizational change through changes 
in people. The changes are accomplished by attempting to influence attitudes, values and 
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norms. By changing people, it is argued, one can cause the creative invention of new tools, 
or one can cause modifications in structure. 
c. Structure and People 
An evaluation of both the structural approach and the people approach by 
Michael Tushman reveals the following: Both approaches to organizational change have 
shown conditional success. Neither can substantiate itself as the best approach under all 
conditions. The literature suggests that some combination, some sequence of approaches, 
may be a more effective way to approach the problem of change. A more general 
approach would necessarily include both structural and behavioral interventions. 
The armies of Napoleon illustrate how both structure and behavior can be factors in 
organizational revolutions. The sense of loyalty to the state changed the behavior of the 
soldiers. In conjunction with the change in behavior, a change in organizational structure, 
in the form of the corps concept, allowed for dramatic improvements in how the task of 
fighting and defeating the enemy was accomplished. One without the other would have 
prevented or dramatically lessened the results of their combined employment. 
D. INDICATORS OF ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE 
Using the conclusions gathered from examining why and how organizations change, 
indicators of these changes can be developed. 
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1. Establishment of New Commands 
If new tasks need to be performed, or if old tasks need to be conducted in a new way, 
often new organizations will be formed to provide this education. This is especially true 
for technological developments. In the past, establishment of training commands to teach 
the principles of aviation, submarine warfare, and use of nuclear weapons were all 
indicative of new capabilities being adopted by the military. Today, principles of 
technologies such as Synchronous Optical Networks (SONETs), computer network 
protocols, and Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) need to be understood to fully exploit 
the possibilities of IW. The establishment of the U.S. Air Force's Information Warfare 
Center at Kelly Air Force Base, Texas is indicative of new commands attempting to better 
understand new technologies and the threat they represent. Although establishment of new 
commands may be more common in response to changes in technology, the recent 
establishment of the Navy Doctrine Command illustrates that new organizations can 
emerge when changes in doctrine are being contemplated. 
2. Creation of New Career Paths 
Creation of new and viable career paths that support and promote innovative 
capabilities are a must if the change is to be successful. In his book, Innovation and the 
Modern Military: Winning the Next War, Stephen Rosen details several examples of how 
critical it is that viable career paths are required for organizational innovations to succeed. 
11
 Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1991), 
p. 252-253.  Additional examples of the relationship between career paths and innovation can be found in 
Allan R. Millet and Williamson Murray, Innovation in the Interwar Period, (Washington, D. C: The 
Office of Net Assessment, 1994). 
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Those examples include several successful cases such as: U.S. carrier aviation, U.S. Army 
airmobile divisions, and U.S. Marine amphibious capabilities. Several cases where 
innovations were less than successful were also examined. Those cases include British 
carrier aviation and U.S. Army counter-insurgency (CI) capabilities during the early 1960s. 
In both the successful and unsuccessful cases, the viability of a career path for the 
organization's up and coming leaders was a decisive factor. The following example of the 
problems faced by British naval aviators during the interwar period vividly illustrates how 
failure to account for the importance of a career can doom an innovation. 
The organization of the Fleet Air Arm made it impossible for any 
Royal Navy officer interested in aviation to pursue that interest without 
jeopardizing his career as an officer. Any Navy officer who wished to 
become an aviator had to be attached to the [Royal Air Force] RAF for 
between three and four years. While with the RAF, it was not clear who 
would promote him. The RAF had little interest in promoting naval 
officers within its own ranks, since they would be returning to the Royal 
Navy.   While with the RAF, however, they could not be promoted by 
the navy. Officers were assured that they would not lose their connection 
with the Navy while with the RAF, but they discovered that when they did 
return they were seldom admitted into Navy schools that would train 
them in traditional naval skills such as navigation and gunnery. Without 
these basic skills they had little chance of being promoted to the command 
of a ship.12 
Today, efforts must be made to ensure a viable career for military officers that desire to 
specialize in the various aspects of information warfare. Facilities where the information 
warrior can become proficient and maintain expertise must be established. However, if 
these efforts result in the centralization of all aspects of IW outside the military or in a joint 
12
 Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War, p. 100. 
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Special organization that has little connection to the individual services, the same problems 
faced by the Royal Navy will likely result. 
3. Status of the Leader 
The status of an organization's leader and leadership can be critical factor in the ability 
of an organization to innovate. Apparently in contradiction to each other, both a change in 
leadership and the longevity of a senior member can be crucial to innovation. 
In step two in Mr. Greiner's eight step model of organizational change, a new person 
either takes command of an organization or becomes intimately involved in determining the 
direction of the organization. Thus one possible reason for changing leadership in an 
organization is that a new direction is being sought. This is not always the case, especially 
in the military where changes in command are routine. However, if changing the direction 
of the organization is considered vital, the new person can be a rising star and have a 
distinct and known vision. 
At the other end of the spectrum, several case studies suggest the need for an individual 
to remain at a key post for an extended period of time for an innovation to be successful. 
During the development of naval aviation, Admiral Moffet served as Chief of the Bureau 
of Aeronautics (BUAER) from 1921 until his death in 1933. His long incumbency gave 
him great credibility with individuals who and organizations which were closely involved 
with the development of naval aviation, such äs the General Board, Congress, and senior 
Navy leadership. This further gave him the ability to protect innovators from interference, 
and to influence the advancement of junior officers. It may also be important in keeping 
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innovative ideas and concepts from being stillborn in the event of failures and accidents.13 
The case of Admiral Rickover and the U.S. Navy's development of nuclear power and a 
strategic arm of the triad, also is indicative of this pattern.14 
4. New Structural Relationships 
A change in how entities of an organization are able to communicate and exchange 
information can be indicative of significant organizational changes. For example, a change 
in the structure of the U.S. military's Joint Task Force (JTF) could make a difference in 
the organization's performance.15 Figure 6 portrays a typical JTF with all of its 
components on one line, which include: U.S. Army forces (ARFOR), U.S. Marine Corps 
forces (MARFOR), U.S. Air Forces (AFFOR), U.S. Navy forces (NAVFOR), and 
Special Operations forces (SOFOR). While this service oriented command structure 
suffices for personnel management and administration, to fight using these component 
commanders as operational commanders alone will simply not work. For fighting, the 
forces must be mixed in a task organization that is designed for the specific mission and 
situation. Difficulties can result if individual commanders do not control all of the JTF 
assets relevant to an assigned mission. 
Director of Net Assessment, Historical Innovation: Carrier Aviation Case Study. Memorandum for 
Distribution, (Washington, D. C: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 24 June 1994). 
14
 Two books detailing the career of Admiral Rickover are Norman Polmar, Rickover, (New York: Simon 
and Schuster, 1982) and Theodore Rockwell, The Rickover Effect: How One Man Made a Difference, 
(Annapolis, MD.: Naval Institute Press, 1992). 
15
 This example was taken from an article by Lieutenant General John H. Cushman, U.S. Army, Retired, 
titled "Make it Joint Force XXI" which appeared in Military Review, No. 2, (March-April 1995), p. 4-9. 
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Figure 6. Corps Integration with a JTF 
A different JTF organization may have a structure as depicted in figure 6. In this 
structure the task, or mission, is the prime factor in where individual elements fit into the 
organization, not which service they come from. Further enhancing this mission oriented 
Figure 7. Mission Oriented Command Structure 
with Maneuver as the Primary Element 
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command structure could be a free and open information flow that produces common 
situational awareness and capability for fingertip-touch throughout the force. The 
information flow would more resemble a bicycle rim with spokes serving as means to 
extract any needed information than the stove pipes of the current structure. 
Changing the structure of the military organization is proposed by Martin Libicki and 
James Hazlett in an article titled, "Do We Need an Information Corps?"16   They believe a 
separate Information Corps would guide the revolution, create a common doctrine for the 
diverse requirements of information warriors, and facilitate liaison among civilian 
information agencies. In addition, Libicki and Hazlett state that the traditional relationship 
between information and force will be turned on its head. No longer will supporting 
elements such as command and control, logistics, and personnel serve the weapon 
operators. Instead, information will become the center piece and other units, of which 
weapon systems are but one, will support the information system. 
5. History of Innovation 
The quote from Machiavelli at the beginning of the chapter recognizes how difficult it 
is to establish a new way of doing business. However, if an organization develops a record 
of change and is able to incorporate innovation within its standard operating procedures, it 
is more likely that future innovations will occur. Unfortunately there is no single formula 
for promoting organizational innovation. The number of management books and 
Martin C. Libicki and James A. Hazlett are both senior fellows in the Institute for National Strategic 
Studies, National Defense University. Their article, "Do We Need an Information Corps?" can be found in 
Joint Forces Quarterly, No. 3, (Autumn 1993), p. 88-97. 
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techniques that are constantly being published are testament to Ulis fact. However, a 
propensity for self-analysis, self-criticism, tolerance for failure, and a reward system to 
encourage innovation are traits of every innovative organization. 
17
 These traits are contained in an undated brief given by Capt. James R. Fitzsimonds of the Office of Net 
Assessment titled, "The Revolution in Military Affairs: Challenges for Defense Intelligence," and an 





Applying indications and warning intelligence methods to the three pillars of a 
revolution in military affairs, technology, doctrine, and organization, is a significant first 
step toward forecasting a potentially hostile revolution in military affairs.   The general 
indicators presented in this thesis provide a base on which indicators of a RMA can be 
identified and expanded upon. Specific indicators for a given country or sub-national 
group would likely include at least some of the following: 
- What are the premier research facilities and the areas being studied? 
- Who is in charge of individual research and development efforts? 
- What were the concepts and goals of the latest military exercise? 
- Which professional journals are most influential and what new concepts are 
being discussed? 
- Who are the rising stars and from which service or community are they 
coming from? 
- What are the areas of intense technical interest? 
Once the country specific indicators are developed, an intelligence collection plan is needed 
to determine how data will be provided to the analysts to assess the status of each indicator. 
This plan must be continuously monitored to ensure all required data is actually being 
provided, new targets are added, and irrelevant targets are deleted. 
For some countries, only niche RMAs may be possible or sought. Niche RMAs are 
specific to only a small part of the warfare spectrum. Information warfare offers an 
excellent opportunity for achieving a niche RMA, especially if the goal is to disrupt an 
enemy's data flow. Several means of attacking a computer already exist such as Trojan 
horses, network worms, and logic bombs. Powerful high-speed computers are widely 
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available and almost anyone can gain access to world wide networks.   The seriousness 
with which the U.S. military takes these possibilities is evidenced by the establishment of a 
dedicated computer security team to respond to computer attacks against defense 
department computers and databases and the establishment of information warfare 
curricula at several professional service schools.1 
Other more conventional means of warfare also have the potential to become a niche 
RMA. For example, if a country such as Iran were able to develop a "brilliant mine" that 
could remain dormant on the ocean floor until a specifically targeted ship (by hull number) 
was detected, the naval balance of power would dramatically shift. However, this 
capability would be largely irrelevant to the Air Force and any land operations. Most 
countries have the capability to achieve a niche RMA if desired, and the source of military 
power is not constant. For this reason, the development and monitoring of indicators 
should not be limited to countries that have traditionally been leaders in military 
technology. 
The order in which a change in technology, doctrine, and organization occurs does not 
in and of itself indicate how close a country is to the realization of an RMA. For this 
reason, the indicators in all three areas are equally important. However, cultural factors 
that are particular to a given country may provide clues as to how close a RMA may be. 
For example, in the former Soviet Union, new doctrine and organizations usually precede 
new technological capabilities. However, in the United States new doctrine and 
1
 Douglas Waller, "Onward Cyber Soldiers," Time, Vol. 146, No. 8, (21 August 1995), p. 38-46. 
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organizations usually follow new technologies. Such cultural factors should be evaluated 
by area and technical experts, in conjunction with all other data, in making an assessment if 
a RMA is near. Over reliance on a single factor such as cultural trends invites the surprises 
discussed in Chapter m. The U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) is indicative that the 
patterns do not always hold. 
A number of additional areas in which intelligence interacts with revolutions in military 
affairs exist, and need to be examined. Many of these areas can be drawn from Professor 
R. V. Jones and his book The Wizard War2. Recall from the beginning of Chapter m, the 
basis for exploring how to detect a potentially hostile RMA was Professor R. V. Jones' 
primary goal for scientific and technical intelligence ~ to ascertain the development of new 
weapons and improvements of existing ones by other countries. Professor Jones' other 
goals include: (1) misleading potential or actual enemies about our own weapons, (2) 
misleading the enemy about the success of his own weapons, (3) assisting technically in 
espionage and its counter, and (4) coordinating scientific and technical intelligence between 
the services. 
An additional area of intelligence and RMAs that should be examined is that of 
determining what new technologies, doctrine, or organizations the intelligence community 
would need to support the war fighter on the various envisioned battlefields. Early 
anticipation of the war fighter's needs is a step toward better intelligence support. 
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